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Executive summary 
This report is part of the EU project “Effects of the CAP reform and possible 
further developments on organic farming in the EU”. Its specific aim is to 
develop consistent scenarios of the possible future developments of organic 
farming in the EU, in order to provide a range of possible policy options. 
The scarcity of statistical data, especially in time series format, has prevented 
the use of traditional forecasting methods. Qualitative information has been 
used to integrate missing data, and to develop a scenario approach that 
uses linguistic variables whose interactions are analysed through fuzzy 
systems rules. 
The information used in this analysis is mainly derived by expert assessment 
and is generated through interactive brainstorming procedures that have 
involved all the project’s partners in an iterative process, covering almost all 
the three years of the project period. 
Our scenarios are aimed at both policy makers and the private sector, and 
may be used as a “wind tunnel” for evaluating specific projects and 
investments in the organic sector: one of the uses of our scenarios has been 
to provide assumptions for computer-aided sector modelling by other teams 
participating in the project. In a similar way, our scenarios may be used as 
“test beds” to evaluate the viability of specific policies or business strategies, 
as well as a starting point for the design and development of new strategies 
and/or policies. 
Using scenarios as strategic analysis tools  
Scenario analysis has been developed in the managerial literature as a tool 
for systematic strategic thinking and planning, in order to identify the forces 
that drive the system and examine the interaction of current trends and 
uncertainties within a given market domain and time frame. It can be 
considered as a way of defining a suitable strategy for forecasting problems 
in complex and rapidly changing social systems. 
In this context, scenarios are tools for strategic analysis and summarise 
different sources of information concerning the future, with special attention 
to actors, aims, mechanisms, and causes and effects of change. They should 
not be considered as mere forecasting techniques, but rather as decision 
making supporting tools, that may anticipate policy options in the presence 
of different possible future states. Scenarios are, therefore, strategic analysis 
tools which summarise a large amount of information  
regarding the future, with specific reference to actors, goals, tools, causes 
and effects of change. Multiple scenarios may be used to characterise the 
range within which the future is likely to evolve. 
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The method of fuzzy scenarios 
Scenario analysis considers the interactions among a set of variables 
supposed to be able to depict the relevant aspects of the system whose 
possible evolutions are to be analysed. Hence, it handles complex 
interrelations, which can become difficult to manage even when only a few 
variables are involved. As a second general aspect, scenarios are often 
based on partial information and/or on linguistically defined variables. In 
such a context, traditional forecasting procedures might fail to consider 
properly the relevant mechanism of the analysed systems. 
Fuzzy scenarios can be considered as special cases of fuzzy systems, which 
are typically used for decision analysis purposes in complex systems. The 
use of fuzzy logic allows the handling of linguistically defined 
variables/system, whilst at the same time maintaining a strong 
methodological rigour. As a result, the final effects of the complex 
interactions describing the organic farming sector system can be presented 
as a linguistic description of possible future states, presented in detail, but 
also easily understandable. 
The scenarios 
The results show five major possible forms that the European market for 
organic products may have assumed by 2010. It does so in terms of trends 
in exogenous and endogenous variables deemed to be key factors in the 
sector examined. A discussion of the policy implications of specific 
developments in distinct scenarios, provides policy makers with a powerful 
tool for devising agricultural policies suited to the circumstances that arise. 
Variables assume two or three linguistic states, and the resulting fuzzy sets 
are defined by triangular membership functions.  
The first scenario is labelled “Gloomy liberalisation”, whose purpose is to 
describe the dramatic impact of ‘unrestrained’ globalisation on organic 
farming. The slackening of state and EU economic intervention and 
substantial deregulation have depressive effects on the organic sector, not 
least because of the removal of income support and the cancelling of agro-
environmental programmes. The overall effect is that of organic production 
deterioration – with lower standards and fewer controls on the supply side – 
so that organic products are no longer perceived as qualitatively better than 
conventional ones; as a general effect, this scenario therefore is generally 
and enduringly deleterious to the development of organic farming, on both 
the demand and supply sides. 
The second scenario is labelled “World Trade Boom” and describes the 
development of the European agricultural sector in response to a regulated  
increase in trade-liberalisation. Two hypotheses have been considered 
concerning consumers reaction to globalisation: in the first one consumers 
accept the increase in international trade without showing any alarm about 
imports of GMOs and derived products, while in the second one the use of 
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controversial technologies in agriculture generates concerns about food 
safety. 
Both variants produce similar results, with a decline in demand for organic 
products and a depressive effect on the perception of the quality of organic 
products, compared with conventional ones. There is also a crisis on the 
supply side, exacerbated by the lack of research and development. In this 
situation, substitute products (like integrated agriculture products) maintain 
their market share. 
The third scenario is a “Business-as-usual” one, and describes the 
development of the organic sector on the basis of the Berlin agreement on 
Agenda 2000: it therefore presupposes no major changes in either the 
market or the CAP, with a political climate slightly in favour of organic 
farming. The overall outcome is medium-to-low demand, given the few 
product or process innovations in the sector, accompanied by medium-to-
high consumer prices, given the low level of supply and the inadequate 
performance of the sector engaged in the processing and marketing of 
organic products. Compatible with this situation is a slight increase in the 
supply of substitute products. 
The fourth scenario is named “Fortress Europe”, and concerns a general 
policy development in line with that envisaged by Agenda 2000, but with 
different degrees of market liberalisation. We envisaged two variants of this 
scenario, according to the hypothesised reactions by the WTO.  
In the first variant, there is a shift in the EAGFF budget towards spending for 
agro-environmental and rural development programmes, and agro-
environmental policy is boosted. The profitability of organic farms increases, 
while R&D stimulates technological progress which in turn stimulates 
organic production. These various factors increase consumer confidence in 
the quality of organic products, exerting positive effects on demand. The 
overall effect is that both demand for and supply of organic products grow, 
also on account of greater utilisation of organic products by processors and 
distributors. 
In the second variant, domestic European policies on support for agriculture 
and rural development are not accepted at the WTO negotiations. 
Consequently, disputes conclude in frequent and increasingly harsh reprisals 
by foreign trade partners. The general level of farm-gate prices falls – on 
both the supply and demand, because of greater globalisation. The supply 
of organic products increases but the organic market continues to be a 
‘niche’ market.  
The fifth scenario, “Organic Paradise”, presents the best (but still realistic) 
conditions for the development of organic farming. It also has two variants, 
according to the level of market globalisation and trade liberalisation 
assumed. The issue of quality becomes a crucial one, while consumers’ 
economic expectations grow, and they become increasingly interested in the 
quality of life and in environmental issues. The maximisation of profit is no 
longer the farmers’ only objective, but it is accompanied by numerous other 
goals, among which is protection of the environment.  
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Both variants show similar results, where European countries develop new 
production models which give priority to quality, and this favours organic 
products. In fact, domestic demand for organic products increases because 
of a fall in the consumer prices of organic products resulting from the fall in 
farm-gate prices. Supply increases as well, under the growth in the 
incentives provided by an agricultural policy very favourable to organic 
farming and high and generalised support for organic farmers. All the factors 
able to stimulate the supply of organic products are in place: greater 
research efforts, better information and technical advice and specific 
technological innovations. Because of the positive impact of organic farming 
on the environment, policy-makers are willing to assign organic farming a 
central role in the achievement of environmental sustainability. Intermediate 
standard products decline, being no longer competitive either with organic 
or conventional ones. 
The main differences between the two variants are that under higher 
globalisation, prices of organic products are lower, both on the farm gate 
and consumer side, and that intermediate standard products maintain their 
competitiveness. 
The issues raised in this report may be useful to different categories of 
actors.  
Indeed, our scenario analysis:  
  addresses the question of whether or not organic farmers and other 
organisations and institutions involved in organic farming are well 
prepared to face the uncertainties of the future as portrayed in our 
scenarios; 
  helps policy makers realise the potential impact of some decisions on the 
future of organic farming in Europe, and understand why their decisions 
could have these effects; 
  by identifying the key driving forces which may be used to influence the 
future development of organic farming in Europe, it offers alternative 
options to both policy makers and market actors in devising their 
strategic direction and translating new insights into actions. 
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Our results support the idea that the crucial determinants of the future 
development of organic farming in Europe are: 
1.  the agricultural and agro-environmental policy which will come into 
effect after the implementation of Agenda 2000;  
2.  the Millennium Round WTO negotiations; 
3.  the future perception and attitudes of consumers and society towards 
issues concerning food safety and the use of modern biotechnology in 
food production. 
At the same time, one should always remember that the purpose of scenario 
analysis is not forecasting the future, but to provide different contrasting 
images of relevant possible futures. 
The scenario analysis presented in this report should help the reader shape 
his/her image of the future development of organic farming in Europe, even 
though he/she may not even partially agree with any of the assumptions 
made by our scenario team or the results obtained.  
Scenario analysis should be regarded as a learning and iterative process; by 
providing a range of possible, plausible futures, the effects of actions can be 
made explicit in a non-threatening way.  
Besides, scenarios may promote discussion and build consensus in shaping 
future policy options; a shared vision of the future of organic farming in 
Europe is the necessary framework for developing appropriate 
recommendations for agricultural policy after Agenda 2000. 
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1  Introduction 
 The aim of this report is to analyse possible evolution paths of organic 
farming in Europe, providing tools for anticipating future possible scenarios 
for policy purposes. 
Anticipating organic farming’s future development is a difficult task, given 
the almost total lack of time series data for the sector. Furthermore, organic 
farming has been until now strongly influenced by agricultural policies, and 
it may be hard to anticipate future policy options and their impact on the 
sector. Also, it seems that factors that originally played an active role in the 
development of organic farming, have been progressively substituted by 
new factors, like policy options, consumer preferences, social and cultural 
changes. Hence, the understanding of the development of organic farming 
is becoming increasingly uncertain, given the scarcity of information about 
how these “new” variables might reciprocally interact. 
Scenarios may be considered as hypothetical images of the future, 
describing the functioning of a system under different conditions, with a 
certain degree of uncertainty. Scenario analysis is therefore a decision 
supporting tool rather than a method for producing precise forecasts.  
The main innovative aspect of scenario analysis with respect to standard 
forecasting techniques is its ability to consider the impact of exogenous 
external shocks or major structural changes of the analysed system. This 
result derives from the use of qualitative information, usually provided by 
expert assessments. 
The results of scenario analysis presented in this report are strongly 
dependent on expert assessments, given the substantial lack of comparable 
time series data on the organic farming sector in Europe of sufficiently long 
duration. Repeated iterative brainstorming sessions have provided the 
necessary information for the analysis: time and spatial frame, relevant 
variables, relationships among variables, future scenarios to investigate. 
The qualitative and linguistic nature of the information obtained has been 
exploited using a fuzzy logic approach in scenario modelling. Fuzzy sets help 
to quantify linguistic variables, hence offering a solution to the problem of 
systems description in the presence of scarce or inaccurate information. As a 
result, it has been possible to obtain scenario modelling based on a solid 
methodological foundation, without renouncing the typical flexibility of 
qualitative approaches. 
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Scenario analysis was carried out in three main steps: first, all the relevant 
information were generated
1, matched with available statistical data, and 
incorporated in the general framework of the scenarios, by defining the key 
factors assumed to influence the future and the driving forces assumed to 
trigger the change; then, the linkages between these variables were 
translated into fuzzy relations, which were analysed and commented by the 
experts involved; lastly, scenarios were graphically sketched and then 
translated into narrative forms, by “fine tuning” the model according to 
experts’ comments and evaluations. 
Five main scenarios were created (of which three had two variants) in order 
to cover the principal possible evolution paths of the organic farming sector. 
The scenarios are the following: 
1.  Gloomy Liberalisation: describes the dramatic impact of deregulation 
and globalisation on organic farming; 
2.  World Trade Boom: describes the development of the European 
agricultural sector in response to a regulated  increase in trade-
liberalisation; 
3.  Business-as-usual: this is a ‘surprise-free’ scenario, that basically 
describes the development of the organic sector given no major changes 
in market conditions and the CAP; 
4.  Fortress Europe: considers a general policy development in line with that 
envisaged by Agenda 2000, with different degrees of market 
liberalisation. 
5.  Organic Paradise: this scenario provides all positive realistic outcomes 
that may ‘trigger’ a major development of organic farming. 
The structure of the report is as follows: the second section presents a 
general introduction to scenario analysis, together with a survey of the 
different available approaches. The third section describes the methodology 
used for the scenario analysis, and finally the fourth section contains the 
analytical description of the scenarios obtained, in a simple, narrative form. 
Conclusive remarks and three appendices concerning methodological 
details and variables definitions end the report.  
                                                       
1 Scenario analysis has been used as an ‘umbrella’ methodology during the development of the EU FAIR 
project ‘Organic Farming & the CAP’; all information gathered during this project, – and published in the 
various volumes of the series ‘Organic Farming in Europe: Economics and Policy’ – as well as in specific 
brainstorming sessions during the scenario workshops, has formed part of the ‘knowledge base’ of this report. 
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2  Methods and tools for scenario analysis: a 
survey 
2.1  Some definitions 
Management consultants and many business organisations have 
increasingly supported the use of ‘scenarios’ rather than ‘forecasts’ for long 
term planning and strategic analysis. Forecasting is strictly connected with 
the idea of providing exact future predictions using mathematical 
manipulations of historical data; due to the failure of time-series and trend 
analysis methods to provide reasonable forecasts (especially in times of 
major structural change), scenario analysis has developed as an alternative 
approach to handle the future and its uncertainties (Bunn and Salo, 1993; 
Schnaars, 1987). 
Scenario analysis differs from other forecasting approaches in two important 
ways. First, it usually provides a more qualitative and contextual description 
of how the present will evolve into the future, rather than one that seeks 
numerical precision. Second, scenario analysis usually tries to identify a set 
of possible futures, each of whose occurrence is plausible, but not assured 
and not necessarily probable (Schnaars, 1987) In this way, scenario analysis 
may be seen as a process of understanding, analysing and describing the 
behaviour of complex systems consistently and, as far as possible, 
completely.  
In the words of Kahn and Wiener (1968), a scenario is an “hypothetical 
sequence of events constructed for the purpose of focusing attention on 
causal processes and decision-points”; Huss (1988)
2 considers that a 
scenario is a descriptive narrative of a set of relevant factors that describe – 
from a probabilistic point of view – alternative representations of future 
economic conditions. 
In this context, scenarios are tools for strategic analysis, and summarise 
different sources of information concerning the future, with special attention 
to actors, aims, mechanisms, and causes and effects of change. According to 
Porter (1985), they can not properly be considered as forecasts, but rather 
as consistent representations of the different possible states of the future.  
A scenario-based approach to planning is implemented by a strict 
interrelation between analysts and decision makers; using scenarios as a 
planning tool may help to introduce dynamic factors within the strategic 
management process. 
                                                       
2 For a detailed survey of scenario analysis models see in particular Bunn-Salo (1993), Huss (1988), Martelli 
(1992) and Schwartz (1992).  
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Many approaches to scenario analysis exist, and the literature is rather vast; 
however, most approaches have the following elements in common 
(Marbach et al., 1991): 
  identification of a ‘present state’, that is a starting point that needs to be 
understood in terms of its inner structure and functioning; 
  identification of several possible future situations, usually referred to as 
final image (Godet, 1985) or future image (Miles, 1985); 
  identification of the path that leads from the present situation to the 
future ones; this generally implies the analysis of the possible evolution 
of a set of relevant variables, and the construction of a – generally 
qualitative – model that guarantees a robust and intrinsically coherent 
explanation of this path. 
2.2  Aims of scenario analysis 
The basic aim of scenario analysis is not forecasting the future, or fully 
characterising its uncertainty, but rather bounding this uncertainty.  
In this sense, scenarios may be seen as complementary to traditional 
forecasting and simulation techniques, in order to provide a composite 
picture of future developments for use as the background for policy-making 
and/or strategic planning. 
Different uncertainty definitions can be considered: 
  risk/opportunity: when it is possible to associate to each event a 
probability, i.e. a quantification of the likelihood that the event occurs; 
  structural uncertainty: when an event is considered possible but there 
is not enough information to assess the probability of its happening; 
  unknown: in some cases events are unimaginable. Of course, this kind 
of event cannot be predicted and, given their nature, it is not possible to 
enumerate or define them in any way. 
Scenario analysis, unlike other more traditional forecasting techniques, tries 
to identify the boundaries that will likely “contain” the future, rather than 
assess the probability of specific events (risks or opportunities) happening. A 
graphical representation by Von Reibnitz (1988) shows a “funnel scenario” 
example, where starting from the present situation, different contrasting 
evolutions can be considered, that can be bounded within the extreme 
scenarios positions. 
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Figure 1  A conceptual model of scenarios 
 
 
 
 
Extreme scenario 
Extreme scenario 
Present  Future 
  5      Scenario of a conceivable future situation 
Ð   Disruptive event 
                  Development of a scenario       Decision point e.g.     
       taking measures 
                  The development line changed by a disruptive        
                event 
 
Source: Von Reibnitz (1988) 
A set of very contrasting and different scenarios is more likely to contain the 
actual future than a “single focused” scenario set. More in general, while 
forecasts can be confirmed or not, depending on the actual event 
happening, scenarios, given their undetermined nature, cannot be “falsified” 
in a Popperian sense (Jungermann, 1985; Van der Heijden, 1996). 
Millet (1988) considers two basic aims of scenario analysis for firm/company 
strategy planning: 
  to forecast the economic environment within which the firm/company 
operates, in order to establish its long term goals; 
  to evaluate different strategic options. Scenarios can be considered as 
benchmarks for alternative strategies. In this sense, Van der Heijden 
(1996) argues that while forecasts are decision making tools, scenarios 
aim to develop strategies and policies. 
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Following also Bunn and Salo’s argumentation (1993), it is possible to 
summarise the aims of scenarios in three basic categories, reflecting different 
approaches to scenario analysis: 
  forecasting and decision making – the development of the future’s 
images in order to select a specific strategy among different alternatives. 
This aim belongs to the general category of strategic planning, requires 
an analytic approach to decision making and is based on a participatory 
planning process. 
  benchmarking – the evaluation of a specific strategy with respect to 
different possible futures. In this case it is necessary to minimise 
prejudices that make decision making processes inflexible, and to 
introduce “extreme” or “catastrophic” scenarios that force actors to 
better visualise their goals and eventually to falsify their basic 
assumptions. 
  institutional – to analyse possible futures (even the not very probable 
ones) and to enhance the organisational learning and understanding of 
external events and reality in general, in order to manage uncertainty. 
The aim is to train decision-makers to operate within unusual and new 
situations, and to take decisions in an uncertain context. 
In general, scenario analysis can be considered as an anticipatory (or 
proactive) strategic planning tool, and may be used as a support for policy 
making and public choice. 
2.3  Criteria for scenarios evaluation 
As a general rule, scenarios cannot be evaluated on the basis of their 
predictive accuracy, as the probability of a single scenario happening 
completely is close to zero (Van der Heijden, 1996).  
As a general criterion, credibility can be used in order to evaluate scenarios, 
which can be considered to have four major determinants, strictly 
interlinked (Helmer, 1981; Bunn and Salo, 1993): 
  Comprehensiveness: the model should be able to take into account all 
relevant events and trends. General and comprehensive scenarios make 
the analysis plausible, but they are time consuming and expensive. 
Actually, there is a trade-off between comprehensiveness and clarity: 
highly detailed scenarios with wide time horizons are usually hard to 
understand and to interpret. 
  Clarity: this depends mainly on three factors. The first one is the 
balance between simplicity and realism; the second one is the 
unbiasedness of procedures translating subjective assessments into 
‘objective’, generally acceptable statements; the third one is the 
complexity of computing algorithms: if these are too complicated, 
decision makers and actors might dislike them. 
  Consistency: this concerns the validity of the basic information set and 
how it has been used, specifically with regard to cause-effect 
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relationships among variables. Nevertheless, too much emphasis on 
consistency, may favour the elimination of scenarios that look 
inconsistent only because they represent innovative situations. 
  Coherence: a scenario is coherent if it does not violate the basic rules 
and assumptions of the theory upon which it is based. For instance, a 
model using probability assessment might have coherence problems if 
these are generated without respecting basic probability theory rules; 
similarly, a scenario of economic development should make clear which 
assumptions are derived from economic theory, and which theory – 
among the contrasting ones – is used. Coherence is a fundamental 
requirement, because it provides the conceptual base for the 
interpretation of results, and favour using scenario techniques with a 
sound theoretical framework.  
2.4  Steps in scenario analysis 
Scenario analysis is based on the understanding of the key factors acting in 
the analysed system, and of the related complexity and uncertainty. In some 
sense, trends, uncertainty, risks and opportunities, and a causal model of 
the analysed system’s present state, are the “ingredients” for the 
development of sound and imaginative scenarios.  
Nevertheless, causality links are not necessarily defined in a parametric way, 
but rather as a set of relationships among relevant variables, usually 
represented by network graphs or influence diagrams. Scenarios can also be 
modelled using more formal approaches, though still involving a direct and 
“transparent” participation of experts and actors, sometimes formally 
organised in a scenario team.  
Building a plausible scenario is a complex task that requires at least three 
steps, each representing a basic element of scenario: analysis of the 
present situation, definition of the images of the future, and 
definition of the “path” linking present and future situations (Figure 
2). These stages are not necessarily pursued in this order. 
These crucial steps, representing a logical approach to scenario construction, 
should be preceded by a preliminary stage, where the general framework 
for the analysis is set (definition of the system to be analysed, of time 
horizon and geographic scope) and a final stage, concerning a narrative 
description of the scenarios and an evaluation of their plausibility.   
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Figure 2  Steps of scenario analysis 
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2.4.1  General framework of analysis 
This preliminary step usually considers the following aspects: 
  key issues or relevant aspects defining the system to be analysed, 
which are relevant for the scenario (e.g. a scenario about the future of 
organic farming in the EU will consider economic, environmental, policy 
and social aspects); 
  time frame of the analysis (e.g. ten or twenty years); 
  geographic frame of the analysis (e.g. the World, the EU). 
Moreover, it is necessary to make clear how judgmental assessments will be 
collected, who will provide them and who will process them. In this phase a 
formal way to collect and process information may be set, by establishing a 
scenario team or panel of experts, and by defining the methodological 
approach to the construction of scenarios to be used (see below, paragraph 
2.5). 
2.4.2  Analysis of the present state 
This step has a crucial role for the entire analysis, as defines all the relevant 
variables to be considered and the relationships among them. 
The following aspects should be considered in this stage: 
  delimitation of the system, through an accurate description of 
external and internal variables: the former are often referred to as driving 
forces – influencing without being influenced by other variables in the 
system; the latter are factors influencing and being influenced by other 
variables in the system; 
  identification of system’s key variables, taking into account the 
necessary trade-off between comprehensiveness and clarity.  
  definition of a causal model, or another representation of the ‘inner 
mechanism’ or reasoning which lead to the present state of the system. 
This analysis is necessarily based on current and retrospective 
knowledge, but needs to include all intuitive judgements and imaginative 
conjectures on how the system has evolved to its present state. In this 
step of the analysis, the interdependencies among variables are 
considered, in order to evaluate the nature and strength of the 
relationships and to better understand possible interactive behaviours. 
This task is often more easily performed with the aid of some analytical 
tools, such as network graphs, influence matrices and diagrams, cross-
impact tables, etc.  
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From a cognitive point of view, the generation of scenarios is still poorly 
understood (Bunn and Salo, 1993). Although most techniques rely heavily 
on the disciplined intuition of the experts, the mental models or cognitive 
maps of the reasoning are not always explicit in many scenario analyses. 
Given the complexity of the systems to be analysed and the cognitive 
limitation of the human mind (Evans, 1982), it is useful to be as transparent 
as possible in showing the mental model or reasoning constituting the core 
causal model underlying the scenarios. 
2.4.3  Description of possible evolution paths 
The results stemming from the analysis of the present state constitutes a test 
for scenario consistency: state consistency, referring to the internal 
consistency of each scenario, and dynamic consistency, referring to 
consistency between the present state and the images of the future. These 
two consistency aspects can be considered as elements of synchronic and 
diachronic analysis. Synchronic analysis investigates the functioning of a 
system in a single time period, while diachronic analysis describes possible 
evolution paths linking the present and different future situations.  
The aim of this step is to work out projections about the future development 
of the system as well as the actual dynamic path underlying the prospected 
change. Again, in this stage is important “to state the reasoning for all future 
projections that are assumptions rather than facts” (Von Reibnitz, 1988). 
2.4.4  Definition of the images of the future 
Once the basic elements of the systems are defined, and the experts have 
analysed various conjectures concerning the future changes in the state of 
the key variables in the system, it becomes possible to define a range of 
possible future scenarios. If relationships among variables are measured in 
probabilistic terms, then each scenario will show an overall probability of 
happening, and it will be possible to rank scenarios according to their 
probability values.  
If scenarios are determined using all possible variables/events combinations, 
it is likely that their number becomes high, and that there are many similar 
scenarios. In this case it is necessary to cluster similar scenarios, in order to 
eliminate redundant information and to offer a more understandable 
scheme of the future, using a few alternative and highly contrasting 
scenarios. 
Again, analysts should take into account the trade-off between 
comprehensiveness and clarity, and avoid discarding potentially interesting 
‘surprise’ scenarios only on the basis of reducing redundancy. 
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2.4.5  Narrative description of the scenarios 
Once the relevant scenarios are selected, it is necessary to build a storyline 
of how the system might look in the different scenarios. The scenarios are 
first drafted in skeleton form, to highlight their main ingredients, linking the 
uncertainties and showing the effects of different assumptions about the 
driving forces on the other variables in the system. Then, they should be 
named and painted in detail, by a verbal narrative describing the events and 
showing how the future might evolve in that direction.  
Scenario names are quite important. The names “act as metaphors so that 
when we were talking about a scenario we could use the name as an 
evocative short-cut, to give people an instant and intuitive picture of each 
scenario, thus providing a framework into which detail could be added” 
(Ringland, 1998). 
The aim of this stage is to provide a way to communicate our ideas about 
the future, and writing up the narratives is an essential part of this process. 
The narrative needs to be “provocative, memorable, eliciting a rich 
imagery” (Van Der Heijden, 1996). The scenario, indeed, is a story – with a 
beginning, a middle and an end, a narrative that links historical and present 
events with hypothetical events taking place in the future. 
2.5  Methods for developing scenarios 
Scenario analysis was originally developed for military strategy purposes 
(Kahn and Wiener, 1968). Starting from the early 70s it has been variously 
used as forecasting tool by some multinational companies, mainly for 
investment strategies and long term planning. Schnaars (1987) argues that 
most of the scenario techniques available at the time of his paper’s 
publication were still based on those developed by the Rand Corporation 
during the 50s. At that time, Herman Kahn and Olaf Helmer were employed 
by the Rand Corporation as analysts for military defence projects 
development. Kahn’s approach is mainly qualitative, as it emphasises 
subjective aspects in particular, while Helmer’s approach has a more 
methodological characterisation. 
In a 1971 paper, Chambers et al. refer to scenarios as “visionary forecasts”. 
The scenario approach was considered quite inexpensive but also 
unsatisfactory. 
Georgoff and Murdick (1986) after more than a decade, show an 
appreciation of scenario analysis particularly for its little time series data 
requirement, low mathematical formalisation, etc. 
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The qualitative approach has been probably the more widely used in 
scenario analysis, while more formalised methods have been less popular, in 
particular inn the early years, mainly due to the lack of affordable 
computing tools. 
In what follows, three different methodological approaches are briefly 
discussed: intuitive logic, trend-impact analysis and cross-impact analysis. A 
scheme of the various approaches is presented in Figure 3. 
Figure 3  Characteristics of main methodological approaches for scenario 
analysis 
 Methodological  approach  Strength   Weakness 
 Intuitive  logic    Flexibility; 
  Simplicity; 
  Intuitive and creative 
perspective; 
  Combination of traditional 
and qualitative forecasting 
techniques. 
  High subjectivity; 
  Low methodological 
formalisation. 
 Trend-impact 
analysis 
  Combination of traditional 
and qualitative forecasting 
techniques; 
  Focus on exogenous 
shocks/impact factors. 
  Low formalisation of 
exogenous shocks/impacts 
identification; 
  Requires time series data for 
rend  extrapolations; 
  Does not take into 
consideration events 
interaction. 
 Cross-impact 
analysis 
Takes into account events 
interaction.  
Theoretical and practical problems 
for changing expert assessments 
into  probabilities. 
2.5.1  Intuitive logic 
Pierre Wack was a pioneer of scenario analysis, and his models allowed 
Shell to anticipate the 1973 oil crisis. His approach, based on intuitive logic, 
represents the less formalised method for scenario analysis, and combines 
and compares qualitative information with the results of traditional 
forecasting techniques. 
The ‘intuitive logic’ approach was initially developed by the Stanford 
Research Institute, and is strictly linked to strategic management methods 
and to companies’ participatory planning processes. 
The background of this approach is that firm/company decisions refer to 
complex relationships involving economic, social, technological, political 
and environmental aspects. Most of these factors are “external” to the 
firm/company and their knowledge allows the improvement of strategic 
decision making. Some of these variables are easy to quantify and to 
forecast (e.g. demographic aspects), while some others are not (e.g. 
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consumers attitudes and lifestyles). The Stanford Research Institute 
considers scenario analysis as a way to evaluate risks, anticipate breakpoints 
and identify trade-offs among competitive firms’ goals. 
The strength of the Stanford Research Institute approach is the capacity to 
create flexible and consistent scenarios from a purely intuitive perspective. 
Given that it does not use mathematical algorithms, it can be easily adapted 
to specific cases that might be relevant in different conditions or periods. 
Nevertheless, as most of social sciences methods, this approach suffers from 
scarce repeatability, and different analysts or experts might produce different 
results using the same method. 
Intuitive logic approaches have been used also by Royal Dutch Shell, thanks 
to Wack (1985a, 1985b). Two kinds of scenarios have been created: the first 
one is defined by Wack as explorative, and is based on time series macro 
economic data extrapolation, and on the definition of the main uncertainty 
sources; the second one is defined as decisional, and tries to modify the 
mental model of reality of the decision makers involved, in order to 
maximise innovative attitudes and ideas towards the future. 
Many of the most popular books on scenario analysis rely on this approach 
(Von Reibnitz, 1988; Van Der Heijden, 1996; Ringland, 1998). 
2.5.2  Trend impact analysis 
The second approach is an intermediate one between intuitive logic and 
cross impact analysis, and represents a trait d’union between scenario 
analysis and traditional forecasting methods. 
Its simplest form is a quantitative statistical forecasting model enriched by 
qualitative assessments, that allows the definition of possible events that 
might modify the estimated trends. 
This approach turns out to be particularly effective for at least two reasons: it 
combines traditional and qualitative forecasting techniques, and stimulates 
analysts and experts to take into account possible effects of “unusual” 
events. Nevertheless, it does not take into account effects of 
interrelationships among variables. 
A further limitation of this method is the low formalisation of the definition 
and evaluation of the trend impacts. From this point of view, models 
employing Analytic Hierarchy Process techniques (Wolfe and Flores, 1990; 
Flores et al, 1992; Saaty and Kearns, 1985; Dennis, 1987; Saaty, 1987) 
represent valuable progress, though in some cases the use of weights instead 
of probabilities might be controversial. 
2.5.3  Cross impact analysis  
Cross impact analysis tackles in a systematic way the problem of 
interdependency among events in scenario building. This approach was 
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originally an evolution of Delphi method, developed by Gordon and 
Hayward (Gordon and Hayward 1968), and it has been often criticised. 
Nevertheless, over the last years it has received a growing interest, specially 
with the wide diffusion of PC’s that facilitates the use of this kind of model. 
Basic concepts of cross impact analysis are (Martelli, 1992): 
  events are considered as interdependent: reality is described either by 
the simultaneous happening of independent events, and/or by 
interactions among independent and conditioned events; 
  such interactions may be effectively represented in a matrix form. 
In other terms, cross impact analysis tries to assess conditional probabilities, 
in a highly interconnected system.   
This approach allows the generation of a large number of synthetic “future 
stories”, that can be considered as basic schemes, or frameworks, for 
scenarios.  
Cross impact analysis approach has generated a lot of different models, and 
Martelli (1992) argues that there are as many cross impact models as the 
number of researchers that adopt it. 
As a general scheme, cross impact models can be divided into two 
categories:  
  probabilistic methods: events’ interdependency is represented through 
conditional probabilities, which are determined by a panel of experts; 
  non probabilistic methods: only compatibility and coherence of joint 
events are considered, rather than precise joint events probabilities 
measurements. This approach is followed, among others, by Porter 
(1985): he argues that coherent assessment of the whole set of joint 
events happening (i.e. of each scenario) actually represents a logic 
evaluation about a scenario's likelihood. Porter’s approach is a purely 
linguistic one, hence following Schnaars’ suggestions. 
Actually, Schnaars (1987; 1990) warns that cross impact analysis should 
avoid highly mathematically formalised procedures, as these might reduce 
scenarios predictive accuracy and clarity of scenarios.  
Wright et al. (1988) argue that probabilistic approaches to cross impact 
analysis might result inconsistent if conditional probabilities are not properly 
derived from expert assessments, while Bunn and Salo (1993) consider that 
scenarios should not be evaluated from a forecasting accuracy perspective, 
as they are long term planning tools and their utility derives mainly from the 
capacity to widen decision horizons and to generate a better understanding 
of cause-effect mechanisms generating future events.  
Recent contributions to the problem of enhancing coherence between 
causal relationships and probabilities have been derived from influence 
diagrams, neural and Bayesian networks. 
Some of the most interesting applications of cross impact methods are the 
BASIC model developed by the Battelle Institute, and the INTERAX model, 
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developed by the Centre for Futures Research. The BASIC approach 
considers scenarios forecasting what events are more likely to happen in the 
future, while the INTERAX model produces also a time frame concerning 
when the forecasted events will happen. 
2.6  Methodological framework of the analysis 
The wide range of different approaches to scenario analysis demonstrates 
that there is as yet no consensus about the best method to use. Each 
method has its own strengths and weakness, and the various solutions 
proposed to overcome the limitations of specific models limitations have 
contributed to increase the general confusion about the state of the art of 
scenario analysis. 
Concerning the application of scenario analysis to organic farming in the 
EU, the lack of detailed quantitative information about the organic products 
market in Europe, does not allow the adoption of trend-impact models, as 
they require more detailed data. 
In most cases, the only available information are qualitative assessments 
deriving from a panel of experts. Nevertheless, this situation turns out to be 
in agreement with a qualitative approach to scenario analysis, that allows 
innovative and creative inputs from the experts to be taken into account, 
without focusing excessively on formal issues. Of course, hard data and 
statistical information, where available, were used as benchmarks in order to 
enhance consistency and robustness of the expert assessments. 
Hence, in the present analysis, an inductive bottom-up approach
3 is used, 
and a selection of the most important key variables influencing the organic 
products market in the EU is performed, in order to reduce the otherwise 
excessively high number of variables to take into account. 
Instead of probabilistic evaluation of the events combinations, here we 
prefer to adopt an approach based on fuzzy logic. Fuzzy theory is in fact a 
powerful tool for managing qualitative and linguistically defined variables, 
hence maximising the effectiveness of expert evaluation derived models. 
Furthermore, it avoids computation complexity and the risk of violating 
probability axioms deriving from conditional probabilities determination 
based on expert assessments. 
The concept of fuzziness arises in all those areas in which subjective 
judgements, assessments and decisions assume a predominant role. 
Decision-making analysis falls within this category, and so too does scenario 
analysis, which is characterized by its combining of objective and subjective 
elements. The literature refers to ‘decision-making in a fuzzy environment’ – 
that is, an environment in which the attributes, goals, limitations and 
                                                       
3 Inductive scenarios are those where it is possible to take into account only a few key factors for forecasting: 
in these cases all the possible combinations of the key factors are determined (Schnaars, 1987). For a 
detailed survey of scenario analysis classification see in particular Schnaars (1987); Ducot and Lubben 
(1980); Martelli (1992); Bunn and Salo (1993). 
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consequences of actions are not precisely known by the decision-maker or 
the analyst (Bellman and Zadeh, 1970; Zimmermann, 1991). In scenario 
analysis, imprecision springs from the ‘expert assessments’, which display 
the intrinsic subjectivity or imprecision typical of human behaviour. The 
linguistic variables used to express these assessments have values which are 
not numbers but words or judgements expressed in natural language. Their 
essential feature is that they are less specific than numerical values, given 
that the words which we use in everyday language are polysemous and 
therefore imprecise. “The polysemous nature of the most frequently used 
words entails that imprecision and vagueness are irremovable components 
of a decision-making process, also because of the prevalent use of natural 
language, which is much more widespread than formal languages and 
symbolic logic” (Zanoli, 1996). The theory of fuzzy sets arose from the need 
to adjust models in a manner such to combine the capacity of natural 
language to convey polysemy and indeterminacy with the advantages of 
algebraic formalization and numerical representation.  
In our approach, fuzzy rules describe relationships and compatibility among 
variables, using linguistic variable states definitions, that make the 
functioning of the described system and the final scenarios easily 
understandable. 
Here we adopt a method of fuzzy scenarios originally introduced by 
Canarelli (1996), which is described in Annex I. 
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3  Developing interactive fuzzy scenarios for 
the organic market 
Scenarios are a way to communicate our ideas about the future, and ideas 
are typically fuzzy and notoriously difficult to communicate. Besides, the 
method used to communicate the scenarios is strictly dependent on who is 
going to use the scenarios and for what. 
Our scenarios are aimed at both business people and policy makers, and 
may be used as a “wind tunnel” for evaluating specific projects and 
investments in the organic sector: one the uses of our scenarios was indeed 
to provide assumptions for computer-aided sector modelling by other teams 
of the EU funded project “Organic farming & the CAP”. In a similar way, 
our scenarios may be used as “test beds” to evaluate the viability of specific 
policies or business strategies, as well as a starting point for the development 
of new strategies and/or policies. 
The scenario technique we adopted hinges upon an inductive, bottom-up 
and interactive approach.  
We started by delimiting the system, in order to reduce its complexity into a 
manageable form for the analysis. We defined the key factors affecting the 
reference system (the market for organic products) in order to obtain a more 
complex representation of the possible futures (or scenarios) towards which 
the sector will evolve, doing so in tandem with a panel of experts (the 
scenario team) asked to assess the system under analysis. 
The flow chart below (Figure 4) outlines the process of scenario construction 
used in this report. Once the decision-making problem to address had been 
defined, and the panel of experts had been established, the next step was to 
define the framework for the analysis proper. This involved defining the 
general objectives of the analysis in terms of spatial and temporal frames. 
This preliminary phase was followed by analysis of the present state, which 
took various aspects into consideration. The brainstorming technique was 
used to draw up an initial list of variables able to describe the system under 
analysis. Then, in order to analyse the key variables (key factors) influencing 
the sector and thereby plot the reference system, the list was reduced with 
the help of a formalised decision-support tool – namely the Analytical 
Hierarchy Process (AHP) developed by Saaty (1980; 1986; 1987; 1989), 
the aim being to select the variables which describe the system most 
efficiently. 
We then defined the internal and external variables that mark out the 
system’s boundaries. For this purpose an influence matrix was constructed 
which enabled study of the interdependencies among the variables. On the 
basis of this matrix it was possible to draw up a system of fuzzy rules which 
constitute the ‘generating mechanism’ of the scenarios. Before the scenarios 
are generated, however, selection must be made of the most important 
scenarios arising from combination of the various external variables. 
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Once generated, the scenarios were tested for coherence and, if necessary, 
revised. The process concluded with the writing-up of the scenario 
narratives, which are reported in the next chapter. 
In what follows, we will explain in more detail the “core” of the “generating 
mechanism” of the scenarios, that is the actual mental model which helped 
us to express, confront, process and communicate our collective ideas about 
the future of organic farming in Europe. 
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Figure 4  The process of scenario building 
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3.1  The “core” model: the generating mechanism of the scenarios  
3.1.1  Scenario team and the framework of analysis 
Scenario analysis is strongly dependent on expert assessments, given the 
impossibility of using comparable and time series data of sufficiently long 
duration about the organic farming sector.  
We held three scenario workshops in various places in Europe, during the 
period from January 1998 until the end of 1999. Repeated iterative 
brainstorming sessions during the scenario workshops provided the 
necessary information for the analysis: time and spatial frame, relevant 
variables, relationships among variables, and future scenarios to investigate. 
The scenario team consisted of members of the Research Institutes 
participating the EU project “Organic farming & the CAP”, who are 
mentioned in the list of contributors in the first pages of this book. 
The time frame of the scenarios was fixed at 2010, as a compromise 
between the necessity to cover a wide time horizon and that of maintaining 
as far as possible a certain degree of model “reliability”.  
The spatial frame was – quite obviously – Europe. 
3.1.2  Key-factors and influence among the variables 
The scenario team ended up selecting the following list of key factors 
influencing the European market for organic products.  
External variables: these are key factors acting as driving forces, influencing 
without being influenced by other variables in the system, and relate to 
three major domains: Society, Institutions and the Market. 
Societal domain: 
  Food scares 
  Consumer confidence 
  Farmers altruistic concerns 
Institutional domain: 
  Controversial technological change in conventional farming 
  Market globalisation 
  CAP reform 
Market domain: 
  Consumer price of conventional products 
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  Farm-gate price of conventional products 
 
Internal variables Internal variables: these are key factors influencing and being influenced by 
other variables in the system, and are grouped in three sets according to the 
reference domains they relate to: 
Micro-variables, which broadly refer to the core neo-classical micro-
economic model of a competitive market: 
  Domestic demand for organic products 
  Domestic supply of organic products 
  Consumer price of organic products 
  Farm-gate price of organic products 
  Relative profitability of organic farming 
  Intermediate standard products 
  Processing & marketing capacity of organic farming 
Meso-variables, which relate to societal, institutional or market linkages 
between the micro-economic agents (firms and households) and the macro-
environment: 
  Organic certification and labelling 
  Availability of organic products 
  Relative food quality 
  Media coverage & profile 
  Promotion & advertising of organic products 
Macro-variables, which refer to the so-called “macro-environment” defining 
the broad set of rules to which the market operators (firms and households) 
are bound in their interaction: 
  Political climate towards organic farming 
  Agro-environmental policy 
  Direct producer support for organic farming 
  Market development indirect support 
  Technological change in organic farming 
  Knowledge systems in organic farming 
 
A definition was agreed upon for each of these variables (Annex II), so that 
all scenario team members shared the same perception of what was being 
discussed.  
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During the scenario workshops – with the help of the scenario team – we 
then modelled the direct relations among the internal variables and between 
the internal and external variables.  
Influence matrices and influence diagrams were the results of such 
modelling efforts, which are reported in Table 1 and Table 2 and in Figure 
5, Figure 6 and Figure 7. A general overview of the scenario model is given 
in Figure 8. 
The matrices report the positive and negative direct relations among the 
variables. Positive relations are identified by a ‘plus’ (+) sign, negative 
relations by a ‘minus’ (-) sign. At this stage it was essential to verify the 
indirect relationships that emerged among the variables and eliminate 
redundant information in order to create a manageable model. However, it 
was decided to keep some of the cyclical links (loops) identified in order to 
emphasise the importance of certain interrelationships among the variables, 
connected by both direct links and indirect links. The problem is that there 
are no theoretical criteria to guide the selection of which redundant links to 
retain and which to discard. The choice was, therefore, guided by common 
sense, in order to retain the maximum amount of information while still 
keeping the number of rules at a manageable level. 
Figure 5 is an influence diagram which exhibits a subset of relationships 
derived from the matrices. It shows the most important links between the 
external variables and  the micro-variables, the modelled relationships 
among the micro-variables themselves, and includes some other relevant 
links as well. Basically, it is a competitive market model, where domestic 
(i.e. European) demand for organic products is supposed to influence 
positively the supply of these products by means of the (producer) price 
effect, which has direct influence on relative profitability between organic 
and conventional production. The virtuous circle is completed by domestic 
primary supply having a positive linkage with the processing and marketing 
capacity of the organic industry, which has an inverse relationship with 
consumer prices of organic products and, therefore, positively influences 
further expansion of domestic demand. The role of substitute products (i.e. 
integrated products and other intermediate standards products), is also 
taken into account. All these micro-relationships are represented in blue. 
Another virtuous circle on domestic market demand is shown via the meso-
level: the increase in supply of organic products pushes up the demand for 
organic certification services and labelling, which positively influence 
domestic demand by increasing the level of information to consumers as 
well as their confidence in organic products. This link is shown in green. 
The most relevant links to micro-variables from the macro variables 
subsystem are represented in black. Technological change favouring 
organic farming as well as direct producer support increase the relative 
profitability of organic farming systems,  while support to market 
development influences positively the processing and marketing capacity of 
the organic industry. A general political climate in favour of organic farming 
reduces the competition from substitute (intermediate standards) products, 
while an expansion of agro-environmental policy is neutral, giving rise to 
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both an increase in the relative profitability of organic farming as well as in 
the supply of substitute products.  
All external variables have one or more direct effect on the micro-variables. 
Domestic demand is the internal variable most influenced by these driving 
forces. In particular, the societal domain affects both the demand for organic 
products and the supply of substitute products, while the institutional 
domain is specially linked with the relative profitability of organic farming. 
External market variables influence both demand and supply of organic 
products. It is worth noting the links between controversial technological 
change in conventional farming – a variable summarising all innovations 
controversial to society and farmers, including GMOs – and the demand 
and supply of organic products (the latter via the relative profitability 
variable). Our model considers that an increase in the diffusion of such 
innovations (e.g. GMOs) will increase the demand for ‘innovation free’ 
products with positive effects on organic products, but will reduce the 
relative profitability of ‘innovation free’ productions systems such as organic 
farming. All these links are shown in red. 
Figure 6 shows the most important links among the meso-variables, 
including some other relevant links as well. It can be seen that external 
variables have a reduced impact on this subset of internal variables, mainly 
depicted by the impact of societal and institutional influences on the media. 
External market driving forces have no influence on the meso sub-system. 
This sub-model is quite simple. Organic certification and labelling has a 
positive link on the level of communication on organic products, 
represented by both the promotion and advertising variable and the media 
and coverage profile. All these have a positive effect on the availability of 
organic products, which is strongly linked with the domestic demand. 
Among micro-variables, the processing and marketing capacity of the 
organic industry has positive impacts on the level of promotion and 
advertising as well as on the general availability of the products. Macro-
variables – namely political climate, technological change in favour of 
organic farming and knowledge systems – influence the meso-system via the 
level of organic certification services as well as by improving the relative 
food quality of organic products, which emphasises the virtuous cycle of 
product availability and media coverage. All the meso-relationships are 
represented in green, while micro and macro influences are shown in blue 
and black, respectively. 
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Figure 7 is a summary of our model of the “macro-environment”, and 
shows the strong impact of the external variables (particularly ‘CAP reform’) 
in defining the broad set of rules to which the organic market operators 
should conform. The reform of the Common Agricultural Policy is expected 
to directly influence all variables in the macro sub-system, excluding 
technical change in organic farming. Apart from CAP reform, the macro-
environment is particularly influenced by Societal factors, with all other 
external institutional and market variables having no direct influence on this 
sub-system.  
Political climate towards organic farming is the macro-variable that is 
influenced most by the external driving forces, and it is also central in our 
model of the macro-environment surrounding the organic sector. It 
influences directly all the other macro-variables (excluding technological 
change). Another key variable is that representing R&D, farmers education 
& training, information, etc. in the organic sector (knowledge systems), 
which has cyclic influences with the political climate as well as with the 
meso-variable relating to organic certification and labelling. It indirectly 
influences the micro sub-system via technological change in organic 
farming. The other macro-variables (agro-environmental policy, market 
development, indirect support and direct producer support) – as already 
mentioned – influence internal variables in the micro sub-system and, 
therefore, transfer the effect of an increase in political support to organic 
farmers in this other system. All macro-variables internal links are shown in 
black. 
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Figure 5  Micro variables sub-system 
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Figure 6  Meso variables sub-system 
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Figure 7  Macro variables sub-system 
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Figure 8  General framework of the organic farming scenario model 
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3.1.3  Description of the possible evolution paths 
Once all the information relative to the way that the variables interacted 
with each  other had been made explicit, the next phase of the analysis 
involved translating the interdependencies shown by the influence matrices 
into a fuzzy system of rules able to represent the workings of the market for 
organic products in Europe. To this end, the scenario team was asked to 
give a qualitative definition of the states that each variable could assume, 
following the fuzzy scenario approach (see Annex I). In general, each 
variable was assigned two or three different possible states (e.g. high, low; 
or, high, medium, low), associated to different ‘linguistic’ levels or degrees 
of the variable. 
Annex III contains the set of fuzzy rules linking the states of the variables 
which were the basis of the scenario generation. 
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Table 1  Influence matrix: external variables 
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Consumer confidence  +            +    +  +       4 
Food scares  +    +        +    +    +    +            6 
Farmers altruistic concerns  +  +         +    +    +  +  +     +  8 
Controversial technological 
change in CF  +            -    +                    3 
Market globalisation      + - + 3                     
CAP reform    +          +        +      +    +  +  +  7 
Consumer price of CP  + + 2                        
Farm-gate price of CP              -                        1 
Legend:  CP = conventional product  OP = organic product 
  CF = conventional farming  OF = organic farming 
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Table 2  Influence matrix: internal variables 
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Domestic demand for OP       +    +     +    +          4 
Domestic supply of OP      +  +              +    -    +    +  +  7 
Organic certification labelling  +           + + 3             
Availability of OP  +                +                    2 
Consumer price of OP  -             + 2          
Farm gate price of OP          +    +                        2 
Relative profitability of OP   +            +     -      +  4 
Relative food quality        +          +    +                3 
Media coverage & profile  +  +  +            + 4            
Promotion & advertising of OP  +                +                    2 
Political climate towards OF     +        +       - +  +  +  +  7 
Technological change in OF    +    +      +  +                      4 
Intermediate standards products  -                   + 2   
Agro-environmental policy              +    +      +  +          +  5 
Processing & marketing capacity 
of OF 
    +  -      +           3  
Direct producer support for OF              +                        1 
Market development indirect 
support in OF 
  + +                      2 
Knowledge systems in OF      +          +      +  +              4 
Total relations  6 4 3 6 2 1 4 2 7 2 5 2 5 1 2 2 1 6   
Legend:  CP = conventional product  OP = organic product 
  CF = conventional farming  OF = organic farming 
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3.1.4  Definition of the different possible representations of the future 
As already mentioned, the scenarios were constructed on the basis of 
hypothesised states associated with the external variables which are the 
‘driving forces’ of the system. 
The scenario team was then able to delineate a group of scenarios on the 
basis of hypothesised trends in the external variables. Each expert was 
asked to express his/her subjective assessment of the possible development 
of the market for organic products in Europe by means of a coherent 
combination of the eight external variables previously defined. The result 
was a set of 15 scenarios, some of which were very similar to each other. To 
avoid redundancy and reduce the number of scenarios, the most similar of 
them were clustered, while the markedly contrasting scenarios were singled 
out, in order to cover the wider range of possible future evolutions  
Five scenarios (of which three had two variants) emerged from this further 
scenario session. They are presented in Table 3 as combinations of the 
various states associated with the external variables. The first column shows 
the present state of the variables according to the scenario team. 
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Table 3  The final scenarios and the states of the external variables 
   
 
Scenarios  Current 
State 
Business 
as usual 
Gloomy 
liberalisation 
World Trade Boom  Fortress Europe  Organic 
Paradise 
  External variables States        consumers 
lose 
consumers 
win 
open to 
trade 
barriers 
to trade 
open to 
trade 
barriers 
to trade 
  Consumer 
confidence 
low   (9)  9          
  average  9  (9)        (9)  9     
  high       9  9  (9)   9  9 
  Food scares  low          9    9  9  9 
  high  9  9  9  9    9     
  Farmers 
altruistic 
concerns 
low  9  9  9  9  9         
  high           9  9  9  9 
  Controversial 
TC in CF 
decreasing  9    9    9    9     
  increasing  9  9  9  9    9    9  9 
  Market 
globalisation 
low              9    (9) 
  average  9  (9)      9   ( 9) (9) 
  high    (9)  9  9  9      (9)   
  CAP reform  unfavourable     9  9  9      
  slightly 
favourable 
9  9               
  highly 
favourable 
        9  9  9  9 
  Consumer price 
of CP 
low      9  9  9  9  9     
  average   (9)           9   
  high  9  (9)              9 
  Farm Gate price 
of CP 
low     9  9  9  9  9  9   
average    9              9 
high  9              
Note: When a value is intermediate between two states these are both indicated with (9). 
Legend:  
CP = conventional product    OP = organic product 
CF = conventional farming    OF = organic farming 
TC = technical change 
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4  The scenarios 
This chapter describes the distinctive features of the five possible forms – 
plus some variants – that the European market for organic products may 
have assumed by 2010. It does so in terms of trends in exogenous and 
endogenous variables deemed to be key factors in the sector examined. 
Each scenario is illustrated through a narrative describing the underlying 
external variables hypothesis, and the consequences on internal variables by 
the year 2010. 
Also, graphical illustrations of major variables are provided, in order to 
better appreciate time dynamics and the extent of scenarios different 
behaviours. 
4.1  Scenario narratives 
The scenario narratives are illustrated in a reader-friendly style, by means of 
the considerations of three hypothetical subjects:  
Agronews Broadcast, that is a network mainly specialising in themes 
concerning EU agriculture, and transmits periodical short analyses about 
conjuncture in the agricultural sector, with some specific attention to 
environmental issues.  
Mr John Dairy is a farmer and represents the average farmer’s opinion, 
though he shows a certain interest in issues concerning organic farming.  
Mrs Maggie Pie is a consumer who comments on the problems and 
opportunities she faces when shopping for food. 
Jointly these three actors offer a view of the scenarios from three distinct 
perspectives: the “institutional” one, given by the broadcast, that reflects the 
hypothesis concerning the external variables underlying each scenario; and 
the consumer and farmer ones, that consider the effects of the different 
hypotheses on external variables on the market of organic products, as 
viewed from the demand and supply side respectively. 
4.1.1  Gloomy liberalisation 
The purpose of this scenario is to describe the impact of deregulation and 
globalisation on organic farming, where the EU experiences a deep 
economic crisis and a generally austere economic environment.  
Agronews Broadcast says… “We are experiencing a reduction of trade 
barriers for agricultural commodities, that increases competition among 
farmers, among others because of the strong development of innovations 
concerning new products and processes in agriculture. Such a situation 
determines increasing managerial difficulties for farmers, who in some cases 
can be forced out of the market.  
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From the demand side, the news is bad as well: consumer confidence is low, 
while concerns about food quality consequences on health are increasing, 
given the difficulty and confusion concerning the identification and 
traceability of foodstuffs. 
The current approach to agricultural and trade policy leads to a substantial 
reduction in farming support, accompanied by a general price reduction in 
agricultural commodities, deriving from growing global competition. Organic 
farmers cannot escape the negative trend for agricultural commodities, and 
their only choice of maintaining a market share depends on their ability to 
adopt marketing strategies that can justify a price premium for organic 
products. The negative situation for agricultural environment in general, is 
emphasised by the augmented propensity of farmers to focus on economic 
aspects rather than on environmentally friendly agricultural practices, which 
becomes of secondary importance given farmers severe economic 
difficulties.” 
Mr J. Dairy: “I am quite worried about the strong reduction in policy 
intervention for supporting agriculture, and I wonder how farmers can face 
the removal of income support: competition with non EU countries is 
growing rapidly: I fear that many colleagues of mine could not stand the low 
prices without some financial support. Well, in this context it is really difficult 
to think something other than trying to maintain income as much as 
possible at the previous levels. It is really hard to imagine adopting some 
agro-environmental practices, especially as the EU does not support them 
anymore. Furthermore, even if I wanted to do it all by myself, I do not think 
I could: it’s difficult to find somebody that can give me some advice or 
training about how to adopt organic farming techniques, and technical 
innovations for organic farming are very few. Consumers too have their 
own problems dealing with the negative economic trend, and do not seem 
very interested in the more expensive organic products. 
Mrs M. Pie agrees: “Under these conditions I’m afraid I cannot worry too 
much about the quality of the food I eat. In fact, I see lots of consumers that 
fear their income will be reduced in the near future, and others who are no 
longer sure of keeping their jobs because of the increasing competition and 
instability of the economic systems. Furthermore, the issue of environment 
in general seems to be nearly forgotten: nobody talks about it anymore, 
there is less news in the media concerning the environment or organic 
farming, and politicians are usually more involved in solving other social 
and macro economic problems. Who knows, maybe environment and 
quality of food are not big problems anymore… Anyway, even if I wanted 
to buy some organic food, it’s getting difficult to find it in the shops, as it is 
not well advertised, and there is not so much choice, as the range of organic 
products is quite poor”. 
Mr J. Dairy “The reason for the poor availability of organic products 
depends a lot on the low demand for them: you know, only rich households 
can afford to eat organic. Prices are in fact quite a bit higher than those of 
conventional products, not only because of the difficulties of farming 
organically, but also because of the high processing and distribution costs 
involved. At the end of the day, the farmer gets a very low price for organic 
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products, but the consumer has to pay much more. Believe me, it would not 
be very convenient for me and for my colleagues to farm organically, so you 
cannot expect a great variety of organic products. Why don’t you try some 
of those intermediate standard products? It seems that those who produce 
them can take some advantage from the confusion and the poor control on 
organic products, and sell them as organic: anyway, I think you will hardly 
be able to notice the difference…with your own senses.” 
4.1.2  World trade boom  
This scenario describes the development of the European agricultural sector 
in response to a regulated increase in free trade, where only rules necessary 
for assuring correct competition and food safety are adopted.  
Two variants have been considered, according to consumer reactions to the 
adoption of a free-trade model for the economy. The first variant (named 
“consumers lose”) delineates a situation where consumers display 
confidence in agricultural product quality and show no suspicion or 
resistance to technological changes in the agricultural sector, especially in 
the field of biotechnology and genetically modified organisms. The second 
variant (“consumers win”) is a scenario in which European consumers 
become increasingly aware of the importance of the quality of the food they 
eat, and of the health implications of its consumption, given the high 
visibility of food safety issues in society. Likewise, consumers are more 
concerned about the effects of (bio-)technological innovations in agriculture, 
which gives rise to a broad debate with the chemicals and seed producing 
multinationals on one side, and consumers on the other.  
The results of the fuzzy rule-base reasoning show that actually the two 
versions are very similar, apart some slight differences concerning agro-
environmental policy, mass media coverage and intermediate standard 
products performance. 
Agronews broadcast says… “Trade liberalisation looks to be the key 
factor in economic growth, given that its effect in terms of the expansion of 
markets, and hence increased competition, heightens the efficiency of 
economic systems. The shift of the global demand function and higher 
productivity generates a growth of GDP in Europe and stimulates 
consumers’ confidence concerning their future welfare. 
In this environment, profit maximisation is the goal pursued by all economic 
actors, and farmers are no exception. The importance given to economic 
issues weakens the environmental concerns of farmers, who may view 
organic methods as hampering efficient farm management. In general, the 
dominant cultural paradigm is oriented more towards utilitarian matters 
than towards altruistic concerns. 
The globalisation of markets facilitates the introduction of new technologies, 
notably biotechnologies and GMOs, which become crucial factors in the 
achievement of greater economic efficiency. The prices of agricultural 
products are closely influenced by the competition raised by extra-European 
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products. The consequence is a substantial fall in the prices of conventional 
agricultural products, which is reflected in lower farm-gate prices. Thus, 
liberalisation leads to the almost total elimination of the external protection 
provided by the CAP, with the consequence that farm-gate prices are 
compelled to align themselves with those prevailing on world markets. The 
move towards free-trade and the reduction of policy support under the CAP 
also has consequences for organic farming, which suffers large cutbacks in 
its economic support.” 
Mr J. Dairy: “CAP has changed so much over the last years! Once farmers 
discussed about prices or direct income subsidies, but now the only 
important thing seems to be the market. Now you can sell your products or 
buy whatever you need for your farm almost everywhere and very easily, 
but you can not expect any help from the EU. Prices are so low that you 
must be extremely efficient in managing your farm, and there is no room for 
“non marketable” activities. Anyway, the EU has cut down a lot on all the 
agro-environmental measures and it is clear that they pay no attention at all 
to organic farming: in fact, they have drastically reduced any kind of support 
for organic farmers. Furthermore, the level of research and technological 
change in organic farming has reduced a lot, and this prevents farmers from 
adopting or continuing organic practices. At the end of the day, farming has 
become just like any other economic activity, and the only thing farmers 
must think of is maximising profit, using all the new technologies for 
agriculture that are now available, which are exclusively applicable to 
conventional farming”. 
Mrs M. Pie: “I have to say that this globalisation has widened a lot the 
range of food products: now they are coming from all over the world, and 
many of them are produced with the new GMO techniques: it seems they 
work well! I have noticed that in this situation the only thing missing is 
organic products: it is getting difficult to find them, and in any case their 
range is not at all comparable to that of the other products. Anyway, this is a 
minor problem, as I do not believe that organic products are better than the 
others: if they were, I think the media would say so sometimes, wouldn’t 
they?” 
 
Mr J. Dairy realises that the general conditions of agricultural markets are 
not favourable to organic farming: “Given that consumers incomes have 
increased, I would expect that they can spend more money on organic 
products, but I can see that they are not at all interested in them. Maybe it is 
because they trust the new technology products, or maybe just because they 
also are only concerned about money, who knows... What I do know is that 
under these conditions organic farming has no opportunity to take off: 
consumers do not want organic products, farmers are dissuaded from 
entering the sector, both by the removal of direct economic support and by 
the fall of farm-gate prices of organic products brought about by marked 
globalisation and stagnant demand, and also the marketing capacity for 
these products is quite low. Believe me, now that profit is the only goal, 
you’d rather go for conventional farming. ” 
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Mrs M. Pie: “Maybe, if people changed their mind about biotechnologies 
and GMOs, then organic products might benefit…”  
Mr J. Dairy: “Hum, I do not think so. It is likely that the only things 
happening would be some more talk-shows on the argument. No, without 
any concrete policy support, organic farming cannot develop. Probably, 
only intermediate standard products would benefit more from food scares, 
since they do not require big production changes from the conventional 
standards, and are therefore less dependent on policy support.” 
4.1.3  ‘Surprise-free’ scenario (business-as-usual) 
This scenario describes the development of the organic sector on the 
assumption that no significant change is made to the decisions arising from 
the Berlin agreement on Agenda 2000, so that the general policy attitude 
towards organic farming is a slightly positive one, supporting the sector 
mainly through the application of EC Reg. 1257/99. 
Agronews Broadcast says… “The underlying assumption of policy 
makers seems to be that European agriculture needs to increase its 
competitiveness, hence getting in the condition to face international 
competition with lower supporting measures. The globalisation of 
agricultural markets increases as a consequence of the lowering of barriers 
against free trade: the result is a fall in farm-gate prices which is only 
partially transferred to consumer prices. 
Farmers perceive this situation as potentially negative for their income, and 
their concerns are mainly of maintaining as much of their competitiveness as 
possible, even if this means that environmental issues might be sacrificed. 
No changes are envisaged in the social perception of food safety or in the 
goals pursued by farmers 
Increasing globalisation on one side and the ageing population on the other, 
leads to reduced consumer confidence in economic and social welfare, but 
the population is extremely worried about the long-term effects of 
genetically modified food products and about other controversial 
technological changes in agriculture.” 
Mr J. Dairy: “Well, things have not changed a lot over the last years, and 
from what I see farmers have the same problems as ever. Prices are now 
much lower, because of the gradual reduction in EU support, and there is 
growing competition from products coming from other countries. In this 
situation organic farming cannot help, I’m afraid. I can see that there could 
be some potential demand for organic products, and still some CAP 
measures can be of help for organic farming, but I think it’s not enough. In 
fact, the situation of the organic sector is quite depressing: there are no 
product or process innovations in organic farming that might stimulate 
improvements in its production techniques or raise the quality of organic 
products over that of conventional ones. This situation implies that there is 
an almost total absence of research, information and training for organic 
farmers. Besides, farm gate prices are much lower than those paid by 
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consumers, because the marketing sector is still underdeveloped, and the 
agro-food industry seems to have little interest in processing organic 
products. Maybe it is because they do not believe in a positive evolution of 
the sector.” 
Mrs M. Pie: “I would buy some organic food, because I really do not like 
all those strange genetically modified products coming from who-knows-
where, but the problem is that their price is quite a bit higher than other 
products, and, you know, nowadays money is an issue! It seems that only 
rich people have the right to eat good food… Anyway, I have to say that 
even if I had more money, organic food would not be as appealing as it 
should, because there are so few products to choose, and they are not 
advertised at all: sometimes it is difficult to identify them or to distinguish 
them from other products.” 
Mr J. Dairy: “Dear Mrs Pie, you are right, I think this depends on the 
scarce information on labelling and certification for organic products: it is 
already difficult enough to farm organically, and at the end of the day, if 
you cannot sell your products as organic, well, it turns out to be a nonsense, 
given that we do not even get any extra money. Under these conditions, 
organic farming is not a good option: after all, we farm to make a living 
from our activity and not to take care of the environment!”  
Mrs M. Pie: “Well, given all these difficulties with organic products, I can 
try some of those from integrated agriculture: they look just as good as the 
organic ones, and are probably better than the GM ones.” 
4.1.4  Fortress Europe 
This scenario considers a general policy development in line with that 
envisaged by Agenda 2000, but with a general attitude in favour regulation 
concerning trade and globalisation.  
It divides into two variants, according to hypothesised reactions by the 
World Trade Organisation (WTO) due to the cautious behaviour of the EU 
about market liberalisation. In the first variant, a compromise is reached 
between the EU and the other countries (mainly USA), while in the second 
no agreement is reached. The second scenario therefore envisages a 
slowdown in market liberalisation, closer control on technological 
innovations in agriculture, and therefore less concern about their possible 
harmful effects on health. 
Fortress Europe open to trade  
Agronews Broadcast says… “The European Commission’s policy, which 
defends a culturally and environmentally-based reform appropriate to the 
specific circumstances of the European countries, is accepted as the basis for 
further WTO trade agreements. Given that an agreement has been reached 
between EU and WTO members, some market globalisation for agricultural 
products is achieved anyway, which is accompanied by the spread of new 
farming technologies – biotechnologies in particular. 
  39  
In exchange for openness to imports and the lowering of domestic prices, 
support is given to small family-run farm businesses, following the blueprint 
of the current version of the ‘Green box’. Given that this is a compromise, 
agriculture achieves relatively modest growth, although the consumer and 
farm-gate prices of food products decrease.  
The commodities price reduction, and a general positive effect of 
globalisation on the entire EU economic and social system, determine a 
moderate upturn in consumer expectations concerning economic growth. A 
drawback in this globally positive scenario is that the wide adoption of 
controversial technological innovation in agriculture increases consumer 
fears about the quality of food and its implications for human health, which 
becomes a central issue.” 
Mr J. Dairy considers this as a very favourable situation for agriculture in 
general, and for organic farming in particular: “I appreciate that the EU 
realises our difficulties in facing international competition, and maintains 
some measures for protecting our products. Also, I like that many farmers 
try to manage farming environmental problems somehow. I think I too will 
take advantage of some of the numerous opportunities that the CAP 
provides for agro-environmental issues, probably one of those that refer to 
organic farming: the direct support for organic farmers is definitely 
something that helps a lot. Apart from financial measures, organic farming 
seems a good option anyway, because there are now good advisory services 
for farmers converting or already converted, and there is also a continuous 
flow of innovations concerning new techniques, machinery, etc. specifically 
aimed to organic farming. Now it is possible to produce more and better 
products and also the distribution channels for organic products have 
improved their efficiency”. 
Mrs M. Pie: “There is much ado about these organic products: I see a lot 
of advertising, and it seems that also the mass media are very interested in 
them. Actually, I think that they are worth the higher price you have to pay, 
since I really prefer spending some more money for having good quality 
food. In fact, I am really scared of those hormone-treated beef or of cereals 
grown from genetically modified seeds: I fear they are no good at all for our 
health! Anyway, there is a wide variety of organic food, so that for almost 
any kind of product you can find the organic version, and you can be sure 
of the organic quality of the food, since labels are easily recognisable and 
advertised”. 
Mr J. Dairy: “You know, Mrs. Pie, now that so many farmers have 
converted to organic practices, it is easier to meet the requirements of you 
customers, and I am glad to hear that you understand that good quality 
food can cost a little more. I have to say that organic products seem to be a 
good bargain: if you consider that prices are higher than for the 
conventional products, that now much more people want to eat organic, 
and that there is also financial support from the EU, well, unless you own a 
very large and high-tech farm, you’d rather go for organic farming. And 
then, last but not least, I am really happy to know that I can run my farm 
properly and also do something to protect the environment. I think it is right 
that those who can stay competitively on the international market stick with 
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conventional farming, but it is a wise thing that smaller farmers have the 
opportunity to maintain their activity offering alternative good organic 
products while safeguarding the countryside”. 
Fortress Europe with barriers to trade  
Agronews Broadcast says… “Although domestic European policies on 
support for agriculture and rural development remain constant, they are not 
accepted at the WTO negotiations. Consequently, the Uruguay Round 
agreement is the only basis for definition of agricultural trade, and disputes 
conclude in frequent and increasingly harsh reprisals by foreign trade 
partners (above all the USA). As a consequence, trade globalisation takes 
place at a lower rate, causing a consistent but slow reduction in farm-gate 
prices.  
The EU still plays a significant role in agricultural policy in general, hence 
also in agro-environmental terms, facilitating the control of controversial 
technological change innovation in agriculture. Furthermore, public opinion 
is quite interested in food safety issues, though the lower consumer 
confidence about economic growth does not “pull” the demand for organic 
farming products.” 
Mr J. Dairy is a little confused about the situation of agriculture in general, 
and of organic farming in particular: “I would say that this could be a nice 
situation for farmers, and organic farmers in particular, since the EU has 
maintained some measures for helping farmers to help international 
competition and for supporting their income. Furthermore, in recent years 
they have improved the specific aids for supporting organic farmers 
incomes, as well as those for developing the distribution and marketing of 
organic products. Also considering what is going on outside the “umbrella” 
of EU measures, the circumstances for organic farming could be considered 
as favourable, as there are many new technical solutions and in general the 
know-how of organic farmers has increased a lot. Nevertheless, I would not 
say that the situation of the organic sector is entirely positive as the results in 
terms of market growth are not encouraging. It looks like consumers, after 
all, are not so interested in organic products, or in other intermediate 
standards products”. 
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Mrs M. Pie: “Maybe you are right, Mr Dairy. Personally I have nothing 
against organic products: on the contrary, I think they are good, and maybe 
better than the conventional ones, but honestly I do not believe that the 
latter are low quality products, or even dangerous for our health: the EU has 
prohibited the import of GMOs and other “strange” products for a long time 
now, so I think that now the choice between conventional and organic 
product is mainly a matter of taste. And from this point of view, organic 
products are not so appealing to consumers: the range of organic products 
is poorer than the conventional one, and there is not much information 
about them. Also, I have started noticing some advertising for organic 
products only over the last few years, so you can understand, dear Mr 
Dairy, why these products happen to be in my shopping baskets only 
occasionally. Furthermore, they are not so cheap, and price is not a 
secondary issue nowadays.” 
Mr J. Dairy: “Dear Mrs Pie, prices are not very low because competition is 
not that high, but this is not necessarily a bad thing: it allows many farmers, 
specially those with small farms, to maintain their income. Besides, I can 
make quite good profit by producing organically, because I am paid higher 
prices than producing conventionally, and there is also the EU direct 
producer support to take into account. In this situation, I believe that if 
organic products have not reached high market shares, well, much of the 
responsibility is on the consumers side: it seems that unless TV news say 
that there is some “food safety crisis”, you do not worry too much about 
what you eat.” 
4.1.5  Organic paradise 
This scenario depicts the conditions that are considered optimal – though 
realistic – for the development of organic farming in Europe. Two variants 
have been considered, one with a low degree of market liberalisation and 
higher price levels for agricultural commodities, and the other with a slightly 
higher market liberalisation, and lower prices level. Results have shown 
negligible differences between the two versions, if we exclude intermediate 
standards and, to a lesser extent, organic products prices. 
Agronews Broadcast says… “Europe is experiencing a period of 
prosperity and economic stability which has increased the level of consumer 
welfare and confidence. Consumer expectations concerning economic 
growth are higher, and their propensity to consume consequently increases. 
Owing to their higher standard of living, consumers are more interested in 
the quality of life, and this generates greater interest in quality food products 
and in environmental issues. 
The concept of quality assumes a broader connotation. It now concerns not 
only the nutritional and health-related aspects of the products, but also their 
ability to meet and satisfy consumers’ needs. The safety of food increases, 
and so too does the confidence of consumers in what they eat. Worries 
about genetically modified products and other controversial technological 
  42  
changes induces growing numbers of consumers to buy organic products, 
which they perceive as safe and guaranteed. 
Farmers, for their part, increasingly participate in the debate on the ethical, 
cultural and environmental implications of productive processes. The 
maximisation of profit is no longer their only objective, and it is 
accompanied by numerous other goals, among which is protection of the 
environment.” 
Mr J. Dairy: “I am pleased to see that all the factors able to stimulate the 
supply of organic products are available: greater research efforts, better 
information and technical advice, and specific technological innovations, 
and I am proud to say that this positive situation has developed pretty much 
thanks to the significant involvement of farmers in changing the shape of the 
agricultural business in Europe. Really, farmers can now be considered to be 
playing an active role in the environment. But it would be unfair not to 
acknowledge the great support of EU institutions and the essential role 
played by the consumers. Actually, these three elements have jointly worked 
to produce what it is not an exaggeration to describe a ‘paradise’ for organic 
farming. CAP has thoroughly supported agro-environmental measures, with 
specific attention to organic farming. Lots of measures have been proposed, 
not only financial, like direct income aids or marketing development 
measures, but also managerial, and many activities which exert a positive 
impact on the environment, such as agro-tourism and rural development, 
have been encouraged. Consumers, on the other side, have shown such an 
interest in organic products, that even farmers that have long been sceptical 
about organic farming have decided to convert.” 
Mrs M. Pie: “You know Mr Dairy, I really do not see any good reason why 
I should not buy organic products: their quality has increased a lot in recent 
times, and now the product range is really large. There are a lot of good 
advertisements for organic products, and also labelling has improved, so 
that now it is easy to find them and to distinguish them from conventional 
products. By the way, I have to say that I do not really like all the new 
technologies they are using for ordinary food products: I do not think they 
are either ethical or healthy. Well, conventional products are a little cheaper 
than organic ones, but money is not the only thing in life!” 
Mr J. Dairy: “Well, conventional products are cheaper, but organic 
products are not expensive anyway: now that supply has increased so 
much, prices have dropped. Nevertheless, organic farming is certainly a 
good bargain, and I would say that it is much more profitable than 
conventional farming, because of the high demand and EU support. Also, it 
is much easier to sell organic products to the processing industry or to 
distribution channels, as now we farmers have reached a good production 
level, which is also quite stable both quantitatively and qualitatively, while 
the processing and marketing sectors have greatly improved their capacity 
to deal with organic products. 
I notice that the greater attention being paid to environmental issues and 
health has also benefited products from integrated agriculture, that have 
more or less maintained their market share, despite the success of organic 
  43  
products: the only losers seem to be the conventional producers. Organic 
farming is indeed the most efficient and innovative way of farming!” 
Mrs M. Pie: “Do you think that the positive situation for organic products 
could be maintained even if the EU adopted a more liberal trade policy? 
Mr J. Dairy: “Yes, I think so, also because presently barriers-to-trade have 
been substantially reduced compared to some years ago, so things would 
not change a lot. Simply, I would expect prices to drop a little, also for 
organic products, but this will be a further advantage for you consumers. 
The only major change I can imagine, is that under these conditions farmers 
producing intermediate standard products may have some troubles: 
consumers who really care about environment and health have now lots of 
organic products at reasonable prices, while the others feel protected 
anyway by the overall improvement in the hygiene and safety of foodstuffs 
in Europe.” 
4.2  Scenarios graphical representations 
Figures 9 to 20 provide a graphical illustration of a variables selection for 
each scenario. The necessity of a selection derives from the high number of 
variables involved in the system, which would complicate too much the 
graphical representation. Hence, referring to the theoretical distinction 
among macro, meso and micro sub-systems (see previous chapter), all 
variables of the micro sub-system have been selected, as they are probably 
the most directly related to the market and production sectors of organic 
farming, while for the two other subsystems, we have chosen those 
presenting the most discriminating trends, and/or those that have been 
considered as best representing the sub-system they belong to. Anyway, 
most of the selected variables show, for the various scenarios, trends very 
similar to those of the non-selected variables of the same subsystem. For 
example, in the macro sub-system, the variable ‘Technological change in 
organic farming’ shows a behaviour similar to that of “Knowledge systems in 
organic farming”, from which it is influenced, while ‘Agro-environmental 
policy’ behaves pretty similarly to ‘Political climate towards organic 
farming’. Again, in the meso sub-system, the variable ‘Promotion and 
advertising for organic products’ has similar trends to that of ‘Organic 
certification and labelling’. This is an index of redundancy of some links, but 
– as we said before – we have preferred to allow for some redundancy in 
the model in order to avoid leaving out important information and for the 
sake of the clarity of exposition. 
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The list of the selected variables for graphical representation is as follows: 
Macro variables:   Political climate towards organic farming 
  Direct producer support for organic farming 
  Knowledge systems in organic farming 
Meso variables:   Organic certification and labelling 
  Availability of organic products 
Micro variables:   Domestic supply of organic products 
  Domestic demand for organic products 
  Relative profitability of organic farming 
 Processing and marketing capacity for organic  
products 
  Farm gate price of organic products 
  Consumer price of organic products 
  Intermediate standards products 
Care should be taken in reading the graphs, because they refer to scenarios 
described in terms of fuzzy logic. Defined verbally, every variable assumes 
two or three linguistic states (see Annex II); each of these fuzzy sets (or fuzzy 
numbers) is defined by a membership function (as mentioned, all the 
functions in our model are triangular in form). Defined for each variable, 
therefore,  is a specific initial value which is ‘transformed’ by its 
corresponding membership function into degrees of membership, i.e. the 
degree of compatibility between the value assumed by the variable and the 
linguistic expression with which the variable was previously defined. After 
defuzzification, a real number is obtained by transforming each output 
obtained at the inference stage and expressed in terms of a fuzzy sub-set 
(deriving from the combination of all the rules). However, in order to avoid 
errors of interpretation, the numbers along the y-axis should be read in 
qualitative and lexical terms, so that ‘0’ stands for ‘minimum value’ and ‘1’ 
for ‘maximum value’, rather than as conventional numerical values. 
Moreover, the trends of certain variables in a particular graph – for example, 
those relative to ‘agricultural price’ variables – cannot be compared against 
each other; if the consumer price line is below the farm-gate price line, this 
does not entail that consumer prices are lower than farm-gate prices, given 
that their numerical definition changes from one situation to another. The 
linguistic state ‘low’ relative to the consumer price variable may be 
associated with numerical values which, in the case of the farm-gate price 
variable, fall within the linguistic state ‘high’. 
A group of scenarios formed by “Gloomy liberalisation”, “World trade 
boom” in the two versions, and “Business as usual” show similar trends for 
all the internal variables, describing an overall unfavourable situation for 
organic farming.  
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On the opposite side, the two variants of the “Organic paradise” and the 
“Fortress Europe – open to trade” jointly show a favourable development 
for organic farming, and again similar trends for all the internal variables. 
An intermediate situation is that described by the “Fortress Europe – with 
barriers to trade” scenario, which for some variables shows similar dynamics 
as those of the first group, while for some others it is much closer to the 
second group. 
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Figure 10   Direct producer support for organic farming 
0,0
0,1
0,2
0,3
0,4
0,5
0,6
0,7
0,8
0,9
1,0
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
year
Gloomy liberalisation World trade boom (cons umers  los e)
World trade boom (cons umers  win) Business as usual
F ortres s  E urope (barriers  to trade) F ortres s  E urope (open to trade)
Organic paradis e (high globalis ation) Organic paradis e (low globalis ation)
 
  47  
Figure 11   Knowledge systems in organic farming 
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Figure 12   Organic certification and labelling 
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Figure 13   Availability of organic products 
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Figure 14   Domestic demand for organic products 
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Figure 15   Domestic supply of organic products 
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Figure 16   Relative profitability of organic farming 
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Figure 17   Processing and marketing capacity for organic products 
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Figure 18   Farm gate price of organic products 
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Figure 19   Consumer price of organic products 
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Figure 20   Intermediate standards products 
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5  Concluding remarks 
This report aims to communicate our efforts in describing consistent ‘future 
images’ of the development of organic farming in Europe till the year 2010. 
From a cognitive perspective, it is still not very clear how human beings 
react to these images of the future (Bunn and Salo, 1993), although 
‘thinking about the future’ is a fundamental characteristic of all humans, and 
one that distinguishes our species from other species. 
In any case, the very process of thinking about the future and exploring the 
implications of alternative futures can have a strong impact on the actual 
future; decision making and strategic option generation (including policy 
formation) are all activities which are directly influenced by scenarios of the 
future. 
The issues raised in this report may be useful to different categories of 
actors. For example, our scenario analysis:  
  addresses the question of whether or not organic farmers and other 
organisations and institutions involved in organic farming are well 
prepared to face the uncertainties of the future as portrayed in our 
scenarios; 
  helps policy makers realise the potential impact of decisions on the 
future of organic farming in Europe, and why their decisions could have 
these effects; 
  by identifying the key driving forces which may be used to influence the 
future development of organic farming in Europe, it offers alternative 
options to both policy makers and market actors in devising their 
strategic direction and translating new insights into actions. 
Our scenarios may be used to perform an internal assessment of the 
organisational capability of organic market actors to survive and develop in 
any of the multiple equally plausible future environments that we have 
envisaged. 
At the same time, scenarios may be used to ‘test’ the validity of the 
organisation’s ‘mission’ or Business Idea in the whole range of future 
environments it may face; this external perspective is useful for generating 
new options for action, using traditional brainstorming sessions or other idea 
generation tools to review the current and new strategies against the 
different depicted scenarios. 
In Figure 21 we summarise the main results of the scenarios, showing for 
each one the performance of the organic sector and the underlying 
assumptions about the macroeconomic situation and economic policy. 
“Organic Paradise” and “Fortress Europe” are the two scenarios showing 
the best results in terms of organic farming development, and they share a 
similar approach to economic policy and international trade policy, where 
European Union institutions maintain an active role concerning agricultural 
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policy. Nevertheless, they differ substantially as far as the hypotheses about 
the economic cycle are concerned: these are positive in the first case and 
negative in the second. 
On the other hand, the other ‘extreme’ scenarios –“World trade boom” and 
“Gloomy Liberalisation”– sharing the common hypothesis of deregulated 
economic policy, show the worst performance of both organic demand and 
supply, although they differ in terms of the hypotheses concerning the 
economic cycle.  
The “Business-as-usual” scenario is also not particularly favourable for 
organic farming, though it is neutral and surprise-free in terms of both the 
economic cycle and economic policy. 
At first glance, it is therefore clear that the political environment is a crucial 
element for the organic farming sector, that might overcome the effects of 
the basic macroeconomic conditions such as consumer confidence and 
general economic trend. 
A more detailed analysis of the basic assumptions and ‘starting states’ of 
each scenario shows that the crucial and most influential determinants of the 
future development of organic farming in Europe are: 
1.  the agricultural and agro-environmental policy which will come into 
effect after the implementation of Agenda 2000;  
2.  the Millennium Round WTO negotiations; 
3.  the future perception and attitudes of consumers and society towards 
issues concerning food safety and the use of modern biotechnology in 
food production. 
Concerning the first point, we think there is a need to further consider the 
impact of the budget cuts on agro-environmental measures arising from the 
fact that in the rural development plans implemented after the EC Regs. 
1257/99 and 1750/99 they have to ‘compete’ with other measures such as 
farm investments, compensatory allowances, and forestry measures. This 
fact, combined with the principle of subsidiarity, may substantially reduce 
the amount of subsidies given to support the conversion/maintenance of 
organic farming in many regions. Besides, it is also important to verify the 
impact of the modulation of supplemental aid deriving from savings of 
mainstream CAP support at the national level. Again, this modulation (as 
from EC Reg. 1259/99) may be very different in the various countries.  
Figure 21  Performance of Main Scenarios for Organic Farming in Europe 
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We, therefore, recommend continued monitoring of the policy and 
regulatory environment for organic farming in Europe, given the fact that 
substantial institutional changes are foreseen, especially at the regional level. 
These issues, concerning the probable outcome of the  implementation of 
Agenda 2000, need to be addressed in the future if an enduring growth of 
the organic sector is seen as desirable. 
As far as the impact of WTO negotiations on the market for organic 
products is concerned, it is quite clear from what happened in Seattle that 
the crucial political issues are: the globalisation of the food market; and the 
kind of international regulatory environment that will be set up. This point 
relates also to the third point – consumers and societal perceptions and 
attitudes – especially as far as GMOs are concerned. 
Scenario analysis has shown that the future development of the market for 
organic products is heavily influenced by what will happen to global food 
markets and how consumers will respond to this globalisation.  
Market and consumers issues are therefore very important, though at the 
moment we lack a lot of relevant information concerning the market of 
organic products, particularly in-depth studies of consumer perceptions and 
attitudes, as well as better knowledge of institutional linkages in the organic 
business.  
A recommendation is to enhance the transparency and information on this 
market, through further studies and better institutional collection of data at 
the national/regional level. Almost no quantitative information is collected at 
the moment and qualitative information based on in-depth interviews of 
consumers and other actors in the market is also necessary to provide the 
firms concerned with tools to develop the organic market beyond the ‘niche’ 
level. A preliminary study of the European market for organic products has 
appeared in Volume 7 of the series ‘Organic Farming in Europe: Economics 
and Policy’. 
Market transparency, in particular, could be further enhanced by increasing 
controls and standards for the inspection bodies (more than for farmers) to 
avoid free-riding practices by increasingly commercial service organisations. 
A direction towards market transparency is surely the recent approval of the 
European logo for organic products, but the linkages between organic 
farming and consumers could be further increased by a Pan-European 
campaign showing the positive impact of organic farming and processing on 
the environment and on health. Health related issues should be further 
explored by targeted research.  
Other conclusions may be drawn as a result of the prospective work 
described in this report. 
The first is that we believe that the scenario analysis presented in this report 
can help the reader shape his/her image of the future development of 
organic farming in Europe, even though he/she may not even partially agree 
with any of the assumptions made by our scenario team or the results 
obtained. Planned action is based on a definition of a current position, of a 
desired future state and on the necessary steps to make the transition from 
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the current to the future state (Van Der Hejden, 1996). Therefore, any 
image of the future helps define the desirable future vision of an 
individual/organisation, even if it is trivial and particularly if it challenges 
his/her view of the future. 
The second conclusion is that scenarios help to ‘unfreeze’ our brains, and 
are therefore essential in any proactive approach to planning. Even though 
some of our narrative may seem anecdotal and – sometimes – even naive 
compared to some ‘serious’ forecasts based on more sophisticated models, 
no one knows what the future will bring and therefore the capacity to 
stimulate and impress – albeit negatively – the reader is an important part of 
the method of scenario analysis.  
The third conclusion is that the successes of scenario analysis are hard to 
pinpoint  and cannot be linked at all with the ability of our scenarios to 
capture what indeed will happen in the future. One should always 
remember that the purpose of scenario analysis is not forecasting the future, 
but to provide different contrasting images of some possible futures. Which 
futures are relevant is strictly dependent on the context of the analysis. We 
will regard our exercise as a success if – with the help of our scenarios – 
farmers, policy-makers and other actors on the organic scene are able to 
create new ideas, identify new opportunities for action, re-think current 
behaviour and react swiftly to the changing conditions of a new 
environment. Only by developing our imaginative capabilities will we be 
able to deal with the world (and particularly the marketplace) of the future. 
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Annex I:   
A primer on fuzzy systems 
Scenario analysis considers the interactions among a set of variables that are 
supposed to be able to depict the relevant aspects of the system whose 
possible evolutions are to be analysed. Hence, it handles complex 
interrelations, which can get difficult to manage even when only a few 
variables are involved. As a second general aspect, scenarios are often 
based on partial information and/or on linguistically defined variables. In 
such a context, traditional forecasting procedures might fail to consider 
properly the relevant mechanism of the analysed systems. 
At present, most of the relevant studies concerning complex systems use 
decision analysis theories as a general framework for managing models 
involving several interacting variables, while fuzzy logic is often used for 
handling linguistically defined variables/system. 
The proposed model for scenario analysis makes a conjunct use of both 
these approaches.  
In what follows, we present a description of decision analysis basic concepts, 
and the way they can be used for scenario analysis through fuzzy rule based 
systems, together with a concise preview of basic fuzzy concepts (for more 
details about fuzzy logic and fuzzy variables see Zadeh, 1965, 1978, Kosko, 
1993, Zimermann 1991).  
Decision analysis  
Decision analysis is the art and practice of decision theory, an axiomatic 
theory prescribing how decisions should be made. It is based on the premise 
that humans are reasonably capable of framing a decision problem, listing 
possible decision options, determining relevant factors, and quantifying 
uncertainty and preferences, but are rather weak in combining this 
information into a rational decision.  
Decision analysis comes with a set of empirically tested tools for framing 
decisions, structuring decision problems, quantifying uncertainty and 
preferences, discovering those factors in a decision model that are critical for 
the decision, and computing the value of information that reduces 
uncertainty. Probability theory and decision theory supply tools for 
combining observations and optimising decisions.  
While decision analysis is based on two quantitative theories, probability 
theory and decision theory, its foundations are qualitative and based on 
axioms of rational choice. The purpose of decision analysis is to gain insight 
into a decision and not to obtain a recommendation.  
Decision analysis hinges upon the definition of a relevant set of variables 
and relationships among variables, whose different combinations might 
produce different decision options. 
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Usually, variables are defined according to certain domains, that is, a range 
of values or states that they can assume according to a certain degree of 
probability or possibility. 
For example, when considering future scenarios for organic products 
markets, a relevant variable might be “supply of organic wheat” whose 
domain might be defined as [low, average, high], or as [less than 120.000 
T; between 120.000 and 150.000 T; more than 150.000 T].  
While there is an infinite number of possible domains, there are two basic 
types leading to two basic classes of variables: discrete and continuous.  
While the distinction between discrete and continuous variables is crisp, the 
distinction between discrete and continuous quantities is rather vague. Many 
quantities can be represented as both discrete and continuous. Discrete 
variables are usually convenient approximations of real world quantities, 
sufficient for the purpose of reasoning.  
Once a suitable set of variables and the respective domain is defined, it is 
necessary to define a proper rule system, describing the way variables 
interact with one another. 
A rule is an expression of the form 
 
if A then B 
 
where A is an assertion and B can be either an action or another assertion. 
For instance the following two rules could be part of a larger set of rules for 
organic farming products: 
 
1.  If “CAP reform” is favourable to organic farming, then “organic farming 
profitability” is high 
2.  If “organic farming profitability” is high, then “organic products supply” 
is high 
 
A rule based system consists of a library of such rules. These rules reflect 
essential relationships within the domain, or rather: they reflect ways to 
reason about the domain.  
When specific information about the domain comes in, the rules are used to 
draw conclusions and to point out appropriate actions. This is called 
inference. The inference takes place as a kind of chain reaction.  
Often the connections reflected by the rules are not absolutely certain, and 
similarly the gathered information is often subject to uncertainty. In such 
cases, a certainty measure is added to the premises as well as the 
conclusions in the rules of the system. Now, a rule gives a function that 
describes how much a change in the certainty of the premise will change the 
certainty of the conclusion. In its simplest form, this looks like: 
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If A (with certainty x) then B (with certainty f(x)) 
 
There are many schemes for treating uncertainty in rule based systems. The 
most common are fuzzy logic and Bayesian Belief Networks. Common to all 
of these schemes is that uncertainty is treated locally. That is, the treatment 
is connected directly to the incoming rules and the uncertainty of their 
elements. Imagine, for example, that in addition to the former we have the 
rule  
 
If C (with certainty x) then B (with certainty g(x)) 
 
If we now get the information that A holds with certainty a and C holds with 
certainty c, what is the certainty of B?  
There are different algebras for such a combination of uncertainty, 
depending on the scheme. Common to all these algebras is that in many 
cases they come to incorrect conclusions. This is because the combination 
of uncertainty is not a local phenomenon, but it is strongly dependent on 
the entire situation (in principle a global matter). 
Fuzzy systems 
As a general definition, a fuzzy system is any system containing variables 
ranging over states that are fuzzy sets (Klir and Yuan, 1995). Here, we 
discuss about fuzzy sets that are fuzzy numbers, and that are associated to 
linguistic variables. 
Fuzzy logic was first introduced by Zadeh [1965]. It offers a generalisation of 
the notion of elements of a set from bivalued membership (i. e. is / is not 
member of a set) to that of multivalued membership (i. e. various degrees of 
membership) and continuous degrees of membership. 
The difference between classic logic and fuzzy logic is illustrated in Figure 
22. Let us try to describe the variable Price using 2 subsets, described by 
labels cheap and expensive, defined by their respective membership 
functions. For instance, in the case of classic logic, we can say that a price 
for a pair of shoes below 60 Euro can be considered as cheap while those 
above 60 Euro are expensive. A price of 85 Euro is expensive and not at all 
cheap. When we consider small price variations close to the value of 60 
Euro, the difficulty of classic logic to provide sensible results becomes 
evident: at 59.99 Euro a price is still fully considered as cheap while at 
60.01 Euro, it is considered as fully expensive. 
Fuzzy logic has been introduced in order to deal with this issue. If the 
membership functions vary monotonically, it is then possible to define 
partial degrees of membership. Hence, a given value can be described by 
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several labels at the same time. Let us take the example of price evaluation. 
A price of 85 Euro is thus 15% cheap and 85% expensive (Figure 22). More 
generally, it can been seen that classic logic is just a special case of the more 
general fuzzy logic [Kosko, 1993]. 
Hence, fuzzy logic appears to be more suitable than classic logic for 
describing the evolution of variables by means of linguistic labels.  
Figure 22  Classic and fuzzy logic: example of price evaluation. 
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Fuzzy sets help to quantify linguistic variables, hence offering a solution to 
the problem of systems description in presence of scarce or inaccurate 
information. Different actual variable values are associated to different 
variable states according to a certain uncertainty degree (forced 
uncertainty). Measurement uncertainty is a result of information deficiency, 
and derives from the general inability of any measuring instrument to 
overcome its limiting finite resolution. 
Besides problems concerning measurement uncertainty, when handling 
continuous variables a further difficulty is the wide range of values to 
consider. When the number of variables is high, the resulting complexity 
might increase excessively. In complex systems, it is necessary to reduce 
complexity when using the system for a given task. For example, to 
understand all the relevant variables necessary to drive a motorbike (throttle 
opening, road conditions, cornering angle, tyres temperatures, etc.,) it would 
not be wise to specify all these factors with high precision. As an example, it 
would be much easier (and safer) to learn the following rule: “do not open 
too rudely the throttle if you are cornering hard and tyres are not warm” 
instead of: “open throttle less than 25% if the corner angle is more than 30 
degrees and your tyres temperature is under 40 °C”. A description of this 
procedure in approximate linguistic terms would be much more efficient and 
effective. The important role of uncertainty in reducing system complexity is 
well described by Zadeh (1973): 
“In our view, it is this fuzzy, […] logic that plays a basic role in what may 
well be one of the most important facets of human thinking, namely, the 
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ability to summarise information – to extract from the collection of masses of 
data impinging upon the human brain those and only those subcollections 
which are relevant to the presence of the task at hand. […]. The human 
brain takes advantage of this tolerance form imprecision by encoding 
approximate relation to the primary data.” 
Fuzzy modelling 
Fuzzy modelling may be considered as a special case of expert system 
implementation. It incorporates a knowledge base, containing the relevant 
inference rules, and an inference engine, whose aim is to determine the final 
effect of rules functioning in specific conditions (Canarelli, 1996; Klir and 
Yuan, 1995). 
The exclusive characteristic of fuzzy modelling is that it is capable of using 
knowledge elicited from human operators, or experts. This is crucial when it 
is difficult or even impossible to construct precise mathematical models, or 
for which the available models are difficult or expensive to use. Difficulties 
may arise from non linearities, time varying nature of the processes to be 
controlled, large unpredictable environmental disturbances etc. In these 
conditions, the knowledge of a human expert might be used as a feasible  
alternative to a “precise” model.  
Fuzzy modelling is capable of articulating imprecise linguistic descriptions 
quite easily through fuzzy rules. As an example, a typical form of these rules 
is: 
 
IF CAP reform is favourable to organic farming 
AND organic product prices are high 
THEN the supply of organic products increases 
 
where the linguistic definitions of the variables (CAP reform, Prices, Supply) 
can be easily managed with fuzzy logic. 
A general scheme of fuzzy modelling is as follows (Figure 23):  
Figure 23  A general scheme of fuzzy modelling 
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Fuzzy modelling can be schematised in five elements: definition of variables 
linguistic states, fuzzification function, fuzzy inference rules, inference engine 
fuzzy rule base, fuzzy inference engine, defuzzification method. 
Definition of variable states 
Once the relevant variables of the system have been identified, and 
eventually distinguished in exogenous (or external) and endogenous (or 
internal)variables, it is necessary to select meaningful linguistic states for 
each one, and to define an appropriate fuzzy membership function. 
For the purposes of the present analysis, it is necessary to point out that the 
choice of one of the various available membership function shapes does not 
influence significantly the overall model functioning.  
Fuzzification function 
Once membership functions are defined for each variable, initial values are 
introduced into the model after being fuzzified. The purpose of fuzzification 
is to interpret measurements of input variables (expressed by a real 
number), as more realistic fuzzy approximations. Stepping back to the price 
example, suppose that the variable price assumes the value of 85 Euro: the 
fuzzification phase will “transform” this real number into linguistic fuzzy 
labels, according to the appropriate degree of uncertainty described by the 
membership function. That is, a price of 85 Euro will be considered in the 
model as expensive with a degree of relevance of 85%, and cheap with a 
degree of relevance of 15%. 
Fuzzy rule base 
The interactions among different variable states are described by fuzzy 
inference rules, like those previously described. Fuzzy rules may be derived 
from expert assessments, or they may be defined through an empirical 
analysis. In the present scenario, all rules are derived from expert 
assessments.  
Fuzzy rules should describe the system behaviour considering all the 
combinations of variable states. For example, considering an oversimplified 
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market model with three variables, price, marketing policies and demand, 
each described by three states (low intermediate and high), the rule base 
could be of the form: 
IF the price is cheap AND the marketing support is strong, THEN the 
demand is high; 
IF the price is expensive AND the marketing support is weak, THEN the 
demand is moderate; 
IF the price is expensive, AND the marketing support is weak, THEN the 
demand is low; 
…and so on, for all the possible combinations of the nine variable states …; 
Of course, when the number of variables and/or of variable states increases, 
the complexity of the fuzzy rule base becomes critical. It could therefore be 
preferable not to consider all the possible combinations, but only those 
considered more relevant or the more extreme ones. 
Inference engine 
The role of the fuzzy inference engine is to combine fuzzified variable inputs 
and fuzzy rule base, in order to obtain a final, predominant result about the 
state of the analysed system.  
According to the previous example, a price of 85 Euro can be considered, 
with different degrees of relevance, cheap or expansive. Hence it would 
“activate” differently the fuzzy rule base, through rules starting as “IF price is 
cheap, THEN…”, and through rules starting as “IF price is expensive, 
THEN…”. The role of the inference engine is hence to derive the final effect 
of a price of 85 Euro in the system. The actual mechanisms utilised are 
based on standard fuzzy logic. In other words, the problem of inference 
regarding the final output of the system becomes the problem of 
approximate reasoning with several conditional fuzzy propositions
4. A 
numerical example of how an inference engine may operate is reported 
below 
Defuzzification method 
The last step of fuzzy controllers procedures is to convert each conclusion 
(or fuzzy result) of the inference engine into a single real number. Though 
the final result turns out to be not arbitrary, there is not univocal 
defuzzification procedure. In our model the centre of area method is 
adopted.  
The scheme of the fuzzy modelling procedure is therefore as follows:  
1.  external variables (inputs) enter as crisp values in the procedure; 
                                                       
4 See Klir and Yuan, 1995, Canarelli, 1996 for details 
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2.  they are fuzzified (hence are split into different fuzzy variable states); 
3.  fuzzified variables interact according to the fuzzy rule base; 
4.  system output (or system final variable states) is obtained through fuzzy 
inference engine; 
5.  finally the fuzzy final variable states are defuzzified 
An example 
A graphical example will help to summarise. Suppose we want to model a 
system, whose behaviour can be explained by Three variables (X Y and Z). 
A typical scenario problem could be to simulate what will happen to 
variable Z when changing variables X and Y. All the variables will be 
standardised, hence assuming values ranging between 0 and 1.  
As an example, we can analyse a very simple organic market model, where 
the variables are: 
Variable X =   food scares 
Variable Y =   political climate towards organic farming 
Variable Z =    intermediate products supply (such as those deriving from  
integrated agriculture). 
It is supposed that there is a positive impact of variable X on variable Z, 
because of a general shift of food demand towards “ecological” food in the 
presence of increasing food scares. 
Alternatively, the relationship between Y and Z is negative, as a supporting 
policy in favour of organic farming should “protect” the sector from 
competitive productions. 
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A graphical scheme of the system is represented in Figure 24 
Figure 24  Example of a simple Model scheme 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Definition of variable states 
For simplicity, variables can be defined using two states:  
Food scares 
Political climate towards 
organic farming 
Intermediate standard  
product supply 
+ 
- 
  Food scares (X): low – high; 
  Political climate towards organic farming (Y): favourable – unfavourable; 
  Intermediate standard products supply (Z): low – high. 
 
Fuzzification 
In Figure 25 are described the membership functions of the three variables. 
For variable X, given an initial value of X = 0.8 the membership to the 
subsets “low” and “high” are respectively 0.2 and 0.8. 
For variable Y given an initial value of Y = 0.6, the resulting membership to 
the subsets “unfavourable” and “favourable” are respectively 0.4 and 0.6. 
Fuzzy rule base 
A simple fuzzy rule base may be as follows: 
1.  IF “food scares”(X) is low, AND if “political climate towards OF” (Y) is 
favourable, THEN “intermediate standard products supply” (Z) is low; 
2.  IF “food scares” (X) is high, AND if “political climate towards OF” (Y) is 
unfavourable, THEN “intermediate standard products supply” (Z) is 
high. 
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Inference engine 
The final effect in the system of the input values X = 0.8 and Y = 0.6 is 
determined as follows.  
A firing strength of each rule is deduced by taking the minimum value of 
each couple (corresponding to X and Y) of membership degrees. Hence, the 
firing strength of Rule 1 is 0.2 and that of Rule 2 is 0.6 (Figure 25). 
The firing strength is then multiplied by the respective membership function 
corresponding to the different variable states. 
The product determines the fuzzy subset resulting for each rule’s consequent 
subset. The final fuzzy result is defined as the sum of the two subsets (Figure 
25). 
Defuzzification 
The last step of the procedure is to calculate a final crisp value from the final 
fuzzy result deriving from the inference engine.  
The crisp value for “intermediate standard products supply” (Z), deriving 
from the initial values X=0.8, Y=0.6, from the adopted membership 
functions and from the fuzzy rule base, is deduced by finding the value Z=zc 
which splits the area of the consequent fuzzy subset into 2 equal areas 
(centre of area method). 
 
  
Figure 25  Example of fuzzy reasoning 
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7
1 
Fuzzy scenarios 
The fuzzy scenario model used here was been originally developed by 
Canarelli (1996) and is based on a dynamic and iterative approach to fuzzy 
modelling. 
The dynamic dimension has been introduced in the model through the 
attribution to the internal variables of a ‘characteristic time’ defined as the 
reaction time of a variable to stimulus coming from other variables. More 
specifically, the characteristic time of the variables should be understood as 
“…the minimum time (as imposed by their own intrinsic inertia) to move 
from a minimum value to a maximum one in a constraint-free context. Of 
course, the actual change will, in practice, require significantly more time 
since the factors which influence the variable considered need themselves 
time to evolve.” (Canarelli, 1996). 
The iterative nature of the model comes from the fact that each time unit 
(i.e. year) is split into small time-increment units, and for each period the 
fuzzy model is applied to the specified values of external variables and to the 
previous computed values of internal variables. The resulting changes in 
internal variables are filtered through considering the variables characteristic 
time, and only a fraction of the change generated through the fuzzy 
reasoning unit is actually inputted for the next iteration, this fraction being 
equal to the ratio of the time step to the variable's characteristic time. 
Before applying the model, it was necessary to decide the following 
questions: 
  the shape of the membership functions describing the states of the 
variables. In this model, variables assume two or three states, and 
membership functions have a simple triangular shape. In fact, in 
applications dealing with social systems, finely tuning the membership 
functions has proven to produce increasing computational complexity 
not compensated by appreciable effects on the final results detail. 
  the attribution to the internal variables of a ‘characteristic time’ defined 
as the reaction time of a variable (this definition is an integral part of the 
model and is therefore not visible); 
  identification of the initial condition of each variable, i.e. definition of the 
linguistic state assumed by the variable in 1999, the year in which the 
simulation was to begin; 
  definition of a time horizon different from the one agreed for certain 
external variables. This decision was prompted by awareness that some 
of the external variables, like reform of the CAP, are functional on 
certain events which are predictable. In the case of the CAP, an 
erroneous prediction would have prejudiced the trend of certain internal 
variables tied to the specific external variable by a particular rule. It was 
therefore decided to define the CAP reform at year 2003, i.e. at the time 
of the mid-term review, and to define the farm-gate prices of 
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conventional agricultural products at year 2006, i.e. on expiry of the 
current planning period of EU agricultural policies. 
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Annex II:  
Definition of the variables and respective 
states 
Legend:  
CP = conventional product 
CF = conventional farming 
OP = organic product 
OF = organic farming 
INTERNAL VARIABLES 
Domestic demand for OP (low, intermediate, high) 
Quantity of domestic (EU) organic products demanded  
Domestic supply of OP (low, intermediate, high) 
Quantity of domestic (EU) organic products supplied. From the "market 
structure" point of view, we are referring only at the upper degree of vertical 
integration: farmers quantity production. 
Organic certification and labelling (not effective, effective, highly 
effective) 
The visibility and the credibility of these services in the market. Quality 
assurance and certification play an important role in market transparency 
for the consumers: the organic label is able to assure visibility and credibility 
to organic products, while a good certification system is a prerequisite for 
market segmentation of organic products. 
Availability of OP (low, high) 
The “product mix” (assortment, quality, etc.) as perceived by the consumers 
Consumer price of OP (low, intermediate, high) 
Prices of organic products paid by final consumers in the market. There are 
two variables who are enable to explain the price mechanisms of OP: 
consumer price of OP and farm-gate price of OP. We distinguished these 
two variables in order to capture the effect of distribution costs which make 
the difference between consumer prices and farm-gate prices.  
Farm-gate price of OP (low, intermediate, high) 
Prices of organic products received by farmers 
Relative profitability of OF (worse, similar, better) 
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The level of profit of organic farming relative to those available in the 
conventional sector  
Relative food quality of OP (worse, similar, better) 
The average quality of organic food products relative to the average quality 
of conventional ones  
Media coverage & profile (not significant, significant) 
Quality and quantity of favourable media coverage on organic market 
Promotion & advertising of OP (not significant, significant) 
Quality and quantity of promotion & advertising in the organic sector 
Political climate towards OF (unfavourable, slightly favourable, highly 
favourable) 
The variable is self-explaining: the level of the variable increase when the 
climate is favourable and decreases when is negative or less favourable. We 
consider political attitude and public opinion on OF as the main aspects to 
define political climate towards OF 
Technological change in OF (slow, similar, fast) 
Process and product innovations in OF  
Intermediate standards products (low, intermediate, high) 
Alternative & environmental friendly agricultural production systems known 
as Integrated Pest Management, low-input farming, etc.. More specifically, 
we are considering substitute products of OP  
Agro-environmental policy (unfavourable, slightly favourable, highly 
favourable) 
It includes all laws, bylaws and regulations aimed at reducing the 
environmental impact of agriculture 
Processing & marketing capacity of OF (low, intermediate, high) 
The development of processing and marketing capacity of the organic agro-
food sector, including quality issues  
Direct producer support of OF (low, high) 
All de-coupled income support schemes such as Reg. 2078/92 
Market development indirect support (low, high) 
All support through market development schemes such as Reg. 951/97, etc.  
Knowledge systems in OF (poorly developed, well developed) 
R&D, farmers education &training, information, etc. in the organic sector 
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EXTERNAL VARIABLES 
Food scares (low, high) 
The level of perception in the society as a whole of all issues concerning 
dangers to food safety such as BSE. salmonella, etc.  
Consumer confidence (low, intermediate, high) 
Consumer confidence in economic prosperity. Therefore we consider both 
the economic situation and the consumer sociological characteristics (social 
status, home location, etc.), one in relation to the other 
Farmers altruistic concerns (low, high) 
This variable measures all environmental & ethical issues as perceived by 
the producers. The inclusion of this variable allow to consider non neo-
classical issues in both the supply and demand side of the market  
Controversial technological change in CF (decreasing, increasing) 
Process and product innovations stemming out of agricultural and biological 
research which are controversial to farmers and the society as a whole. This 
variable includes only those highly controversial innovations such as 
biotech, GMOs, etc. 
Market globalisation (low, intermediate, high) 
This variable captures all issues of market globalisation including the 
political ones: WTO, EMU, Extension of the EU, impact of USDA organic 
standards & Codex Alimentarius on EU regulations, etc.  
CAP reform (unfavourable, favourable) 
All changes to be made to EU agricultural & food policy starting from 
Agenda 2000 and EU Reg. 2091/92 reform 
Consumer price of CP (low, intermediate high) 
Prices of conventional food products paid by final consumers in the market 
Farm-gate price of CP (low, intermediate high) 
Prices of conventional products received by farmers 
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Annex III: 
The fuzzy rule base 
1.  if consumer_price_cp is low then domestic_demand_op is low 
2.  if consumer_price_cp is intermediate then domestic_demand_op is 
intermediate 
3.  if consumer_price_cp is high then domestic_demand_op is high 
4.  if consumer_price_cp is low then intermediate_standards_products is 
low 
5.  if consumer_price_cp is intermediate then 
intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
6.  if consumer_price_cp is high then intermediate_standards_products is 
high 
7.  if consumer_confidence is low then domestic_demand_op is low 
8.  if consumer_confidence is intermediate then domestic_demand_op is 
intermediate 
9.  if consumer_confidence is high then domestic_demand_op is high 
10.  if consumer_confidence is low then political_climate_towards_of is 
unfavourable 
11.  if consumer_confidence is intermediate then 
political_climate_towards_of is slightly_favourable 
12.  if consumer_confidence is high and food_scares is high then 
political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable 
13.  if consumer_confidence is high and farmers_altruistic_concerns is high 
then political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable 
14.  if consumer_confidence is low then intermediate_standards_products is 
low 
15.  if consumer_confidence is intermediate then 
intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
16.  if consumer_confidence is high then intermediate_standards_products 
is high 
17.  if consumer_confidence is low then agro_environmental_policy is 
unfavourable 
18.  if consumer_confidence is intermediate then 
agro_environmental_policy is slightly_favourable 
19.  if consumer_confidence is high then agro_environmental_policy is 
highly_favourable 
20.  if food_scares is low and controversial_tc_in_cf is decreasing then 
domestic_demand_op is low 
21.  if food_scares is low and controversial_tc_in_cf is increasing then 
domestic_demand_op is intermediate 
22.  if food_scares is high and controversial_tc_in_cf is decreasing then 
domestic_demand_op is intermediate 
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23.  if food_scares is high and controversial_tc_in_cf is increasing then 
domestic_demand_op is high 
24.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low and cap_reform is unfavourable 
then domestic_supply_op is low 
25.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high and cap_reform is unfavourable 
then domestic_supply_op is intermediate 
26.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low and cap_reform is favourable then 
domestic_supply_op is intermediate 
27.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high and cap_reform is favourable then 
domestic_supply_op is high 
28.  if food_scares is low and political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
then organic_certification_labeling is not_effective 
29.  if food_scares is high and political_climate_towards_of is 
highly_favourable then organic_certification_labeling is highly_effective 
30.  if political_climate_towards_of is sligtly_favourable then 
organic_certification_labeling is effective 
31.  if food_scares is low then media_coverage_profile is not_significant 
32.  if food_scares is high then media_coverage_profile is significant 
33.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low then media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant 
34.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high then media_coverage_profile is 
significant 
35.  if food_scares is low and political_climate_towards_of is 
highly_favourable then intermediate_standards_products is low  
36.  if food_scares is low and political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
then intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
37.  if food_scares is high and political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
then intermediate_standards_products is high  
38.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low and political_climate_towards_of is 
highly_favourable then intermediate_standards_products is low  
39.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low and political_climate_towards_of is 
unfavourable then intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
40.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high and political_climate_towards_of 
is unfavourable then intermediate_standards_products is high  
41.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low and cap_reform is unfavourable 
and political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable then 
agro_environmental_policy is unfavourable 
42.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low and cap_reform is unfavourable 
and political_climate_towards_of is slightly_favourable then 
agro_environmental_policy is slightly_favourable 
43.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high and cap_reform is unfavourable 
and political_climate_towards_of is slightly_favourable then 
agro_environmental_policy is slightly_favourable 
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44.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low and cap_reform is favourable and 
political_climate_towards_of is slightly_favourable then 
agro_environmental_policy is slightly_favourable 
45.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high and cap_reform is favourable and 
political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable then 
agro_environmental_policy is highly_favourable 
46.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low then 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is low 
47.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high then 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is high 
48.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is low then knowledge_system_of is 
poorly_developed 
49.  if farmers_altruistic_concerns is high then knowledge_system_of is 
well_developed 
50.  if food_scares is low and controversial_tc_in_cf is increasing then 
relative_profitability_op is worse 
51.  if food_scares is high and controversial_tc_in_cf is increasing then 
relative_profitability_op is similar 
52.  if food_scares is low and controversial_tc_in_cf is decreasing then 
relative_profitability_op is similar 
53.  if food_scares is high and controversial_tc_in_cf is decreasing then 
relative_profitability_op is better 
54.  if controversial_tc_in_cf is decreasing then media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant 
55.  if controversial_tc_in_cf is increasing then media_coverage_profile is 
significant 
56.  if market_globalisation is high then farm_gate_price_op is low 
57.  if market_globalisation is intermediate then farm_gate_price_op is 
intermediate 
58.  if market_globalisation is low then farm_gate_price_op is high 
59.  if market_globalisation is low then processing_marketing_capacity_of is 
low 
60.  if market_globalisation is intermediate then 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is intermediate 
61.  if market_globalisation is high and 
market_development_indirect_support_of is high then 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is high 
62.  if cap_reform is unfavourable then political_climate_towards_of is 
unfavourable 
63.  if cap_reform is favourable then political_climate_towards_of is highly 
_favourable 
64.  if cap_reform is unfavourable then direct_producer_support_of is low 
65.  if cap_reform is favourable then direct_producer_support_of is high 
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66.  if cap_reform is unfavourable then 
market_development_indirect_support_of is low 
67.  if cap_reform is favourable then 
market_development_indirect_support_of is high 
68.  if cap_reform is unfavourable then knowledge_system_of is 
poorly_developed 
69.  if cap_reform is favourable then knowledge_system_of is 
well_developed 
70.  if farm_gate_price_cp is high and farm_gate_price_op is intermediate 
then relative_profitability_op is worse 
71.  if farm_gate_price_cp is intermediate and farm_gate_price_op is low 
then relative_profitability_op is worse 
72.  if farm_gate_price_cp is high and farm_gate_price_op is low then 
relative_profitability_op is worse 
73.  if farm_gate_price_cp is intermediate and farm_gate_price_op is 
intermediate then relative_profitability_op is similar 
74.  if farm_gate_price_cp is low and farm_gate_price_op is low then 
relative_profitability_op is similar 
75.  if farm_gate_price_cp is high and farm_gate_price_op is high then 
relative_profitability_op is similar 
76.  if farm_gate_price_cp is intermediate and farm_gate_price_op is high 
then relative_profitability_op is better 
77.  if farm_gate_price_cp is low and farm_gate_price_op is high then 
relative_profitability_op is better 
78.  if farm_gate_price_cp is low and farm_gate_price_op is intermediate 
then relative_profitability_op is better 
79.  if domestic_demand_op is low then farm_gate_price_op is low 
80.  if domestic_demand_op is intermediate then farm_gate_price_op is 
intermediate 
81.  if domestic_demand_op is high then farm_gate_price_op is high 
82.  if domestic_demand_op is low then media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant 
83.  if domestic_demand_op is high and agro_environmental_policy is 
highly_favourable then media_coverage_profile is significant 
84.  if domestic_demand_op is low and food_scares is low then 
political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
85.  if domestic_demand_op is low and farmers_altruistic_concerns is low 
then political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
86.  if domestic_demand_op is intermediate then 
political_climate_towards_of is slightly_favourable 
87.  if domestic_demand_op is high and food_scares is high then 
political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable 
88.  if domestic_demand_op is high and farmers_altruistic_concerns is high 
then political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable 
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89.  if domestic_supply_op is low and market_globalisation is low then 
availability_op is low 
90.  if domestic_supply_op is intermediate and market_globalisation is low 
then availability_op is low 
91.  if domestic_supply_op is low and market_globalisation is intermediate 
then availability_op is low 
92.  if domestic_supply_op is intermediate and market_globalisation is 
intermediate then availability_op is high 
93.  if domestic_supply_op is intermediate and market_globalisation is high 
then availability_op is high 
94.  if domestic_supply_op is high and market_globalisation is intermediate 
then availability_op is high 
95.  if domestic_supply_op is high and market_globalisation is high then 
availability_op is high 
96.  if domestic_supply_op is low then organic_certification_labeling is 
not_effective 
97.  if domestic_supply_op is intermediate then 
organic_certification_labeling is effective 
98.  if domestic_supply_op is high then organic_certification_labeling is 
highly_effective 
99.  if domestic_supply_op is low and media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant then political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
100. if domestic_supply_op is low and relative_food_quality is worse then 
political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
101. if media_coverage_profile is not_significant and relative_food_quality is 
worse then political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
102. if domestic_supply_op is intermediate and media_coverage_profile is 
significant and relative_food_quality is better then 
political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable 
103. if domestic_supply_op is intermediate then 
political_climate_towards_of is slightly_favourable 
104. if domestic_supply_op is high and media_coverage_profile is significant 
and relative_food_quality is better then political_climate_towards_of is 
highly_favourable 
105. if relative_food_quality is similar then political_climate_towards_of is 
slightly_favourable 
106. if domestic_supply_op is low then intermediate_standards_products is 
high 
107. if domestic_supply_op is intermediate then 
intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
108. if domestic_supply_op is high then intermediate_standards_products is 
low 
109. if domestic_supply_op is low then processing_marketing_capacity_of is 
low 
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110. if domestic_supply_op is intermediate then 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is intermediate 
111. if domestic_supply_op is high then processing_marketing_capacity_of 
is high 
112. if domestic_supply_op is low then 
market_development_indirect_support_of is low 
113. if domestic_supply_op is high then 
market_development_indirect_support_of is high 
114. if political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable then 
market_development_indirect_support_of is low 
115. if political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable then 
market_development_indirect_support_of is high 
116. if domestic_supply_op is low and political_climate_towards_of is 
unfavourable then knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed 
117. if domestic_supply_op is high and political_climate_towards_of is 
highly_favourable then knowledge_system_of is well_developed 
118. if organic_certification_labeling is not_effective then 
domestic_demand_op is low 
119. if organic_certification_labeling is effective then domestic_demand_op 
is intermediate 
120. if organic_certification_labeling is highly_effective then 
domestic_demand_op is high 
121. if organic_certification_labeling is not_effective then 
promotion_advertising_op is not_significant 
122. if organic_certification_labeling is highly_effective and 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is high then 
promotion_advertising_op is significant 
123. if organic_certification_labeling is highly_effective and 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is intermediate then 
promotion_advertising_op is significant 
124. if organic_certification_labeling is not_effective then 
knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed 
125. if organic_certification_labeling is highly_effective then 
knowledge_system_of is well_developed 
126. “if availability_op is low then domestic_demand_op is low 
127. if availability_op is high then domestic_demand_op is intermediate 
128. if availability_op is low then media_coverage_profile is not_significant 
129. if availability_op is high then media_coverage_profile is significant 
130. if consumer_price_op is low then domestic_demand_op is high 
131. if consumer_price_op is intermediate then domestic_demand_op is 
intermediate 
132. if consumer_price_op is high then domestic_demand_op is low 
133. if consumer_price_op is low then intermediate_standards_products is 
low 
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134. if consumer_price_op is intermediate then 
intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
135. if consumer_price_op is high then intermediate_standards_products is 
high 
136. if farm_gate_price_op is low then consumer_price_op is low 
137. if farm_gate_price_op is intermediate then consumer_price_op is 
intermediate 
138. if farm_gate_price_op is high then consumer_price_op is high 
139. if relative_profitability_op is worse then domestic_supply_op is low 
140. if relative_profitability_op is similar then domestic_supply_op is 
intermediate 
141. if relative_profitability_op is better then domestic_supply_op is high 
142. if relative_profitability_op is worse then media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant 
143. if relative_profitability_op is similar then media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant 
144. if relative_profitability_op is better and relative_food_quality is better 
then media_coverage_profile is significant 
145. if relative_profitability_op is worse then 
intermediate_standards_products is high 
146. if relative_profitability_op is similar then 
intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
147. if relative_profitability_op is better then 
intermediate_standards_products is low 
148. if relative_profitability_op is worse and agro_environmental_policy is 
unfavourable then knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed 
149. if relative_profitability_op is worse and agro_environmental_policy is 
slightly_favourable then knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed 
150. if relative_profitability_op is similar and agro_environmental_policy is 
unfavourable then knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed 
151. if relative_profitability_op is similar and agro_environmental_policy is 
slightly_favourable then knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed 
152. if relative_profitability_op is similar and agro_environmental_policy is 
highly_favourable then knowledge_system_of is well_developed 
153. if relative_profitability_op is better and agro_environmental_policy is 
slightly_favourable then knowledge_system_of is well_developed 
154. if relative_profitability_op is better and agro_environmental_policy is 
highly_favourable then knowledge_system_of is well_developed 
155. if relative_food_quality is worse and domestic_demand_op is low then 
availability_op is low 
156. if relative_food_quality is similar and domestic_demand_op is low then 
availability_op is low 
157. if relative_food_quality is worse and domestic_demand_op is 
intermediate then availability_op is low 
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158. if relative_food_quality is similar and domestic_demand_op is 
intermediate then availability_op is low 
159. if relative_food_quality is better and domestic_demand_op is 
intermediate then availability_op is high 
160. if relative_food_quality is similar and domestic_demand_op is high 
then availability_op is high 
161. if relative_food_quality is better and domestic_demand_op is high then 
availability_op is high 
162. if relative_food_quality is worse then media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant 
163. if relative_food_quality is similar then media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant 
164. if media_coverage_profile is not_significant and 
promotion_advertising_op is not_significant then 
domestic_demand_op is low 
165. if media_coverage_profile is significant and promotion_advertising_op 
is not_significant then domestic_demand_op is intermediate 
166. if media_coverage_profile is not_significant and 
promotion_advertising_op is significant then domestic_demand_op is 
intermediate 
167. if media_coverage_profile is significant and promotion_advertising_op 
is significant then domestic_demand_op is high 
168. if media_coverage_profile is not_significant then domestic_supply_op is 
low 
169. if media_coverage_profile is significant and 
market_development_indirect_support_of is low then 
domestic_supply_op is intermediate 
170. if media_coverage_profile is significant and 
market_development_indirect_support_of is high then 
domestic_supply_op is high 
171. if promotion_advertising_op is not_significant then 
media_coverage_profile is not_significant 
172. if promotion_advertising_op is significant then media_coverage_profile 
is significant 
173. if political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable then 
media_coverage_profile is not_significant 
174. if political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable then 
media_coverage_profile is significant 
175. if political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable then 
direct_producer_support_of is low 
176. if political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable then 
direct_producer_support_of is high 
177. if technological_change_of is slow then domestic_supply_op is low 
178. if technological_change_of is similar then domestic_supply_op is 
intermediate 
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179. if technological_change_of is fast then domestic_supply_op is high 
180. if technological_change_of is slow and media_coverage_profile is 
not_significant then availability_op is low 
181. if technological_change_of is fast and media_coverage_profile is 
significant then availability_op is high 
182. if technological_change_of is slow then relative_profitability_op is 
worse 
183. if technological_change_of is similar then relative_profitability_op is 
similar 
184. if technological_change_of is fast then relative_profitability_op is better 
185. if technological_change_of is slow then relative_food_quality is worse 
186. if technological_change_of is similar then relative_food_quality is 
similar 
187. if technological_change_of is fast then relative_food_quality is better 
188. if intermediate_standards_products is low then domestic_demand_op is 
high 
189. if intermediate_standards_products is intermediate then 
domestic_demand_op is intermediate 
190. if intermediate_standards_products is high then domestic_demand_op 
is low 
191. if intermediate_standards_products is low knowledge_system_of is 
poorly_developed 
192. if intermediate_standards_products is high knowledge_system_of is 
well_developed 
193. if agro_environmental_policy is unfavourable then 
relative_profitability_op is worse 
194. if agro_environmental_policy is slightly_favourable then 
relative_profitability_op is similar 
195. if agro_environmental_policy is highly_favourable then 
relative_profitability_op is better 
196. if agro_environmental_policy is unfavourable then 
media_coverage_profile is not_significant 
197. if agro_environmental_policy is unfavourable then 
technological_change_of is slow 
198. if agro_environmental_policy is slightly_favourable then 
technological_change_of is similar 
199. if agro_environmental_policy is highly_favourable then 
technological_change_of is fast 
200. if agro_environmental_policy is unfavourable then 
intermediate_standards_products is low 
201. if agro_environmental_policy is slightly_favourable then 
intermediate_standards_products is intermediate 
202. if agro_environmental_policy is highly_favourable then 
intermediate_standards_products is high 
  85  
  86
203. if processing_marketing_capacity_of is low then consumer_price_op is 
high 
204. if processing_marketing_capacity_of is intermediate then 
consumer_price_op is intermediate 
205. if processing_marketing_capacity_of is high then consumer_price_op is 
low 
206. if processing_marketing_capacity_of is low then 
promotion_advertising_op is not_significant 
207. if processing_marketing_capacity_of is low then availability_op is low 
208. if processing_marketing_capacity_of is high then availability_op is high 
209. if direct_producer_support_of is low then relative_profitability_op is 
worse 
210. if direct_producer_support_of is high then relative_profitability_op is 
better 
211. if market_development_indirect_support_of is low then 
processing_marketing_capacity_of is low 
212. if knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed then 
organic_certification_labeling is not_effective 
213. if knowledge_system_of is well_developed then 
organic_certification_labeling is highly_effective 
214. if knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed then relative_food_quality 
is worse 
215. if knowledge_system_of is well_developed then relative_food_quality is 
better 
216. if knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed then 
technological_change_of is slow 
217. if knowledge_system_of is well_developed then 
technological_change_of is fast 
218. if knowledge_system_of is poorly_developed then 
political_climate_towards_of is unfavourable 
219. if knowledge_system_of is well_developed then 
political_climate_towards_of is highly_favourable 
 